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ABSTRACT
The fiscal policy-money supply relationship is examined 
within the context of a small structural model of the economy. The 
Federal Reserve is assumed to act as though it minimizes a static 
quadratic loss function subject to its perception of the structure 
of the economy. The loss function contains as arguments the weighted 
squared deviations of actual from desired values for real GNP, the 
inflation rate, a balance-of-trade measure, and a short-term interest 
rate. The first three arguments represent macroeconomic concerns of 
the Federal Reserve and the last argument is employed as a proxy for 
Federal Reserve concern with financial market stability.- The macro- 
economic model employed as a proxy for the Federal Reserve's percep­
tion of the structure of the economy is a linear variant of the 
IS-LM model that incorporates endogenous net taxes, an endogenous 
wealth measure, inflationary expectations, and budget constraints 
for both the fiscal and monetary authorities.
The solution to this constrained optimization problem yields 
a policy reaction function that relates the Federal Reserve's policy 
variable - unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve requirement 
changes - to desired values of the arguments in the loss function 
and to lagged endogenous and exogenous variables of the model, which 
include two fiscal variables. The coefficients on the exogenous
ix
fiscal variables in this equation are analyzed to determine the 
expected effect of these variables on the Federal Reserve's policy 
variable. These coefficients are complex mixtures of the structural 
parameters and weights in the loss function. Given widely held 
expectations about the signs of the structural parameters, the 
expected signs on the fiscal variables depend upon the relative 
weights in the loss function. It is shown that if the weight on 
the financial market stability proxy exceeds a weighted sum of the 
weights on the macroeconomic variables in the loss function, then 
the expected signs on federal expenditures and exogenous federal net 
taxes are positive and negative respectively. Coefficients of these 
signs thus indicate accommodation of fiscal policy by the Federal 
Reserve.
To determine the anticipated effect of the fiscal policy 
variables upon the money supply, the reaction function is added to 
structural model and the reduced form money supply equation is 
derived. It is shown that accommodation of fiscal policy by the 
Federal Reserve is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the 
reduced form coefficients on expenditures and net taxes to be posi­
tive and negative, respectively.
To empirically test the direction of effect of fiscal policy 
upon the monetary policy variable and the money supply, the IS-LM 
model, with and without the reaction function, is estimated over 
the period 1953-1976 utilizing three-stage least squares. The 
estimated coefficients on federal expenditures and exogenous federal
net taxes in the reaction function are positive and negative, 
respectively, thereby suggesting that within the same quarter the 
Federal Reserve accommodates expansionary fiscal policy. The signs 
of these coefficients thus imply that the Federal Reserve weights 
financial market stability more heavily than the macroeconomic 
stabilization goals. However, it should be noted that while within 
the same quarter financial market stability seems to dominate other 
goods, Federal Reserve behavior is significantly influenced by 
these other goods.
Solution of the models for the reduced form money supply 
equations reveals that the coefficients on the fiscal variables in 
these equations are positive for federal expenditures and negative 
for net taxes. However, the coefficients for the model without the 
reaction function are substantially smaller than for the model with 
the reaction function. These results suggest that failure to con­
sider the response of the Federal Reserve to fiscal policy leads 





A recent development in theoretical and empirical macro­
economics - the rise of monetarism - has stimulated interest in 
the role of money in the economy. Monetarists have asserted the 
primacy of the causal role of money in determining the level of 
output and prices. In describing the emphasis of the monetarist 
approach to macroeconomics, one prominent monetarist, Milton 
Friedman, has declared: "I regard the description of our position
as 'money is all that matters for changes in nominal income and 
for short-run changes in real income' as an exaggeration but one 
that gives the right flavor of our conclusions.""*' The primacy of 
the causal role of money has been much debated in recent years, and 
while many mainstream non-monetarists have not denied a significant 
role to money, one leading non-monetarist, Franco Modigliani, has 
suggested that "we are all monetarists now" in the sense that most
Friedman, "A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis," 
in R. J. Gordon, ed., Milton Friedman's Monetary Framework: A
Debate with His Critics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1974), p. 27.
2This debate has theoretical and empirical elements. For 
a good summary of both of these elements, see A. S. Blinder and R. M. 
Solow, "Analytical Foundations of Fiscal Policy," in A. S. Blinder 
and R. M. Solow, et al., The Economics of Public Finance (Washington 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 57-78.
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economists now believe that the money stock has an important effect
qupon the level of output and prices.
Although a great deal of research effort has been invested 
in studies of the effect of money on the economy, relatively little 
effort has been invested in examining the underlying determinants of 
changes in the money stock. Typically the level or rate of change in 
the money stock has been taken as exogenous in studies which address 
the economic effects of changes in the money stock. As noted by 
R. J. Gordon:
In addition to their lack of investment of research 
effort in the short-run dynamics of wage and price 
adjustment, monetarist authors have been slow to shift 
their attention from the role of money as the basic 
determinant of income and price changes to the more ^ 
fundamental underlying determinants of changes in money.
The debate over the role of money in the economy has been 
accompanied by a debate over the efficacy of fiscal policy in altering 
the level of output and prices. Some monetarists have denied any 
significant fiscal policy effects upon real output unless the fiscal 
policy actions are accompanied by changes in the money stock. For 
example, one monetarist, David Fand, has written:
^F. Modigliani, "The Monetarist Controversy or, Should We 
Forsake Stabilization Policies?," American Economic Review, 67, 2 
(March 1977), p. 1.
^R. J. Gordon, "Recent Developments in the Theory of Infla­
tion and Unemployment," Journal of Monetary Economies, 2, 2(April, 
1976), p. 198.
3
To the monetarist, the impact of fiscal actions will depend 
curcially on how the government deficit is financed: expen­
ditures financed either by taxing or borrowing involve a 
transfer of resources (from the public to the government), 
with both interest rates and wealth effects on private 
portfolios, but the net effect of a temporary change in 
fiscal policy on spending may be ambiguous... . On the 
other hand, if the deficit is financed through money creation 
by the banking system —  if the deficit is monetized —  the 
effect is unambiguously expansionary.^
While many non-monetarists would agree that fiscal actions financed 
through money creation are more expansionary than fiscal actions 
financed through taxation or issuance of bonds, few would assert no 
significant effects from tax or bon financed actions.^ The simula­
tion of large scale models of the economy has provided empirical 
support for significant fiscal policy effects upon real output, 
although the magnitude of the effects varies with the mode of finan­
cing the fiscal action. In terms of total effects, money financed
D. I. Fand, "Some Issues in Monetary Economics: Fiscal
Policy Assumptions and Related Multipliers," in T. M. Havrilesky and 
J . T . Boorman, eds., Current Issues in Monetary Theory and Policy 
(Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1976),
p. 233.
^See for example, W. H. Branson, Macroeconomic Theory and 
Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 278-96. It should be 
noted that in a long-run theoretical context, Blinder and Solow 
have demonstrated that under some conditions, the long-run mul­
tiplier for bond financed fiscal actions is greater than for money 
financed fiscal actions. See A. S. Blinder and R. M. Solow, "Does 
Fiscal Policy Matter?," Journal of Public Economies, 2, 4 (November 
1973), pp. 319-37.
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fiscal actions ranks first, followed respectively by bond financed 
and tax financed fiscal actions.^
While much research effort has been invested in separate 
studies of monetary and fiscal policies, relatively little effort has 
been devoted to the study of the relationship between monetary and 
fiscal policies. Macroeconomic models have been constructed that 
include a budget constraint for the government, an innovation that
g
does link monetary and fiscal policies. The budget constraint 
reflects the necessity for a fiscal policy action to be financed in 
some manner - through taxation, the sale of securities to the public,
^See for example, N. N. Choudhry, "Integration of Fiscal and 
Monetary Sectors in Econometric Models: A Survey of Theoretical
Issues and Empirical Findings," International Monetary Fund Staff 
Papers, 23, 2 (July 1976), pp. 424-33 and F. Modigliani and A. Ando, 
"Impacts of Fiscal Actions on Aggregate Income and the Monetarist 
Controversy: Theory and Evidence," in J. L. Stein, ed., Monetarism
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.), pp. 17-42.
^Models with a budget constraint are described in: C. F.
Christ, "A Simple Macroeconomic Model with a Government Budget 
Restraint," Journal of Political Economy, 76, 1 (January/February 
1968) pp. 53-67; Blinder and Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Matter?," 
pp. 112-27; E. F. Infante and J. L. Stein, "Does Fiscal Policy 
Matter?," Journal of Monetary Economics, 4, 2(November 1976), pp. 
473-500; A. S. Blinder and R. M. Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy Still 
Matter?," Journal of Monetary Economies, 4, 2(Noveraber 1976), pp. 501- 
10; C. F. Christ, "Some Dynamic Theory of Macroeconomic Policy Effects 
on Income and Prices Under the Government Budget Restraint," Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 4, l(January, 1978), pp. 45-70; and B. Hansen, 
"On the Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Taxonomic Discus­
sion," American Economic Review, 63, 4(September 1973), pp. 546-71.
With the exception of Hansen, these studies assume the 
authority for both monetary and fiscal policymaking resides in 
one political unit - the government. As noted by Hansen this 
assumption does not fit the institutional reality of U.S. policy­
making in the post-Accord period.
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or through an increase in the monetary base. These models thus allow 
the analysis of fiscal policy actions under different assumptions 
about the financing of the policy change. For example, these models 
permit the analysis of the output and price effects of, say, an 
expansionary fiscal action under the assumption that the policy move 
is financed by an increase in the monetary base.
While the budget constraint models allow the study of the 
relationship between fiscal and monetary policies under alternative 
assumptions about the financing of a fiscal policy change, these 
models do not provide any insight into the reaction of the monetary 
authorities to a particular fiscal policy action when the authority 
for fiscal and monetary policies resides in different decision making 
entities. This institutional arrangement, of course, characterizes 
the formulation of monetary and fiscal policies in the United States. 
In this institutional setting fiscal policymakers have only two 
direct means of financing a deficit - taxation or sale of securities 
to the public. Neither of these two modes of finance has any sig-
Qnificant direct effects upon the monetary base or the money stock.
A relationship between fiscal and monetary policies is often asserted, 
but is seldom systematically analyzed. For example, Fand asserts: 
"Fiscal deficits are obviously often associated with, if not directly
gFor a detailed discussion of this point see Chapter III of 
this study.
responsible for, substantial increases in the monetary aggregates.""^® 
(My emphasis added.) Fand does not, however, explain how the deficit 
leads directly to the increase in the monetary aggregates.
In the case of the United States, some analysts contend that 
because of an over-riding concern by the Federal Reserve to stabilize 
interest rates in the short-run an expansionary fiscal policy leads 
more or less mechanically to an increase in the money supply. In this 
view an expansionary fiscal policy action results in a budget deficit 
which must be financed through issuance of government securities. The 
sale of these securities to the private sector puts upward pressure 
upon market interest rates. This upward pressure is countered by 
Federal Reserve purchases of outstanding government securities thereby 
monetizing, at least in part, the debt issued to finance the deficit. 
Thus because of the effect of fiscal policy and its financing upon 
interest rates, the Federal Reserve, according to this view, accom­
modates expansionary fiscal policy by engaging in open market opera­
tions that expand the money supply.^
The suggestion that the primary goal of the Federal Reserve 
is interest rate stabilization is extreme. Certainly the Federal 
Reserve proclaims a wider range of goals than just interest rate 
stabilization. Examination of the minutes of the Federal Open Market
^®Fand, "Some Issues," p. 234.
^For an example of this approach see D. R. Francis, "How and 
Why Fiscal Actions Matter to a Monetarist," Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis Review, 56, 5 (May 1974), pp. 4-7.
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Committee meetings and the annual reports of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System reveals stated concerns with the growth
of real output, the rate of unemployment, the price of inflation, the
repercussions of international economic events upon the U.S. economy,
and financial market stability (often concern with fluctuations in
interest rates is taken as a proxy for concern for financial market 
12stability). In addition, studies which have estimated policy
reaction functions for the Federal Reserve have concluded that Federal
Reserve policy actions reflect a significant concern for macroeconomic
13stabilization goals as well as the financial market stability goal.
12See any issue of the Federal Reserve Bulletin (Washington,
D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) or any recent 
issue of the Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System).
■^See for example, J. H. Wood, "A Model of Federal Reserve 
Behavior," in G. Horwich, ed., Monetary Process and Policy (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1967), pp. 135-66. T. Havrilesky, "A 
Test of Monetary Policy Action," Journal of Political Economy, 75, 3 
(June 1967), pp. 299-304; M. W. Reran and C. T. Babb, "An Explana­
tion of Federal Reserve Actions (1933-68)," Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis Review, 51, 7 (July 1969), pp. 7—20; A. F. Friedlaender, 
"Macro Policy Goals in the Postwar Period: A Study in Revealed Pref­
erence ," CJ^iarterl^ Journal o£ Economics^ 87, 1 (February 1973), pp. 
25-43; R. T. Froyen, "A Test of the Endogeniety of Monetary Policy," 
Journal of Econometrics, 2, 2 (July 1974), pp. 175-88; and T. M. 
Havrilesky, R. H. Sapp, and R. L. Schweitzer, "Tests of the Federal 
Reserve’s Reaction to the State of the Economy 1964-74," Social 
Science Quarterly, 55, 4 (March 1975), pp. 835-52.
8
Theoretical analyses of the fiscal-monetary policy relation­
ship which begin from the premise that the dominant goal of the
Federal Reserve is interest rate stabilization bias the conclusion 
*
of the analysis toward acceptance of monetary accommodation of fiscal 
policy. This bias will be examined in more detail in a later chapter, 
but a simple example will illustrate the source of this bias. Suppose 
the Federal Reserve has two concerns - one is interest rate stabiliza­
tion and the other is the inflation rate. Suppose now that the fiscal 
authorities initiate an expansionary policy action which is successful 
in stimulating aggregate demand. This fiscal policy move will tend to 
raise both the inflation rate and the interest rate. If Federal 
Reserve concern with inflation is sufficiently greater than its 
concern with interest rate stabilization, the Federal Reserve will 
take policy actions which will lower the money supply, a policy course 
that will reinforce the initial upward pressure on interest rates.
On the other hand, if interest rate stabilization dominates over the 
concern for inflation, the Federal Reserve will take actions that 
will expand the money supply and thereby reinforce the pressure on 
the inflation rate.
In one set of circumstances the Federal Reserve acted to 
blunt the stimulative effects of the fiscal action, but in the other 
case the Federal Reserve acted to reinforce (accommodate) the fiscal 
action. Thus it is seen that concern with inflation relative to 
concern with interest rate stabilization determines Federal Reserve
9
response to fiscal policy. The theoretical analysis of the fiscal- 
monetary policy relationship is thus complicated by consideration of 
multiple goals for the Federal Reserve. This simple example is 
intended only to illustrate the complications introduced when multiple 
goals for the Federal Reserve are considered. The multiple goal case 
will be analyzed rigorously in Chapter IV of this study.
This study analyses the theoretical and empirical relationship
between fiscal policy and the money supply when the Federal Reserve is
assumed to pursue both macroeconomic stabilization goals and the goal
of financial market stabilization. A linear variant of the IS-LM
macromodel with endogenous taxes, inflationary expectations, and a
14government budget constraint is specified and estimated. The effect 
of fiscal policy upon the money supply is examined initially under 
the presumption that the behavior of the Federal Reserve is exogenous 
to the model. While this assumption is often made, it is tantamount 
to suggesting that the Federal Reserve responds only randomly or not 
at all to economic events.
The effect of fiscal policy upon the money supply when the 
Federal Reserve is assumed to respond systematically to economic 
events is next analyzed. The Federal Reserve is hypothesized to 
minimize a quadratic loss function which contains as arguments the
14While the budget constraint is explicit in the theoretical 
model, it is implicit in the estimated model. For a discussion of 
this point see Chapter V of this study.
weighted squared deviations of actual from desired values of real 
GNP, an inflation rate, a balance of trade measure, and a short-term 
interest rate subject to its perception of the structure of the
\
economy. The IS-LM model described earlier is employed as a proxy 
for the Federal Reserve's perception of the structure of the economy. 
The solution to this constrained optimization problem yields a policy 
reaction function that relates the Federal Reserve's policy instrument 
to desired values of the arguments in the loss function and to exo­
genous and lagged endogenous variables in the structural model - which 
include the fiscal variables. Analysis of the coefficients on the 
fiscal variables in the reaction function permits specification of 
the conditions under which the Federal Reserve can be expected to 
accommodate fiscal policy in the sense that an expansionary fiscal 
policy will be accompanied by an expansion in the monetary policy 
variable.
The model, with the policy reaction function appended, is 
estimated by iterative three-stage least squares for the period 1953- 
76. Quarterly data are employed in the estimation. The estimated 
model is then employed to derive numerical estimates of the impact of 
fiscal policy upon the money supply. Analysis of the model also 
provides evidence on the Federal Reserve's pursuit of macroeconomic 
stabilization goals over this period. Finally, analysis of the model 
provides evidence on the Goldfeld-Blinder argument that model mul­
tipliers will be biased if policymakers reacted systematically to the
11
state of the economy over the period of estimation and this systematic 
reaction is not explicitly accounted for in the model.M
The remainder of this study will now be outlined. Chapter 
II contains a review of the literature dealing with the fiscal-monetary 
policy relationship. The IS-LM model is specified and the effects of 
fiscal policy upon the money supply when Federal Reserve behavior is 
exogenous are analyzed in Chapter III. The Federal Reserve loss 
function is specified and the fiscal policy effects upon the money 
supply when Federal Reserve behavior is endogenous are analyzed in 
Chapter IV. Chapter V presents the estimated model and estimates of 
the impact multipliers of the fiscal variables upon the money supply. 
Chapter VI summarizes the theoretical and empirical results derived 
in the previous chapters.
Ms. M. Goldfeld and A. S. Blinder, "Some Implications of 
Endogenous Stabilization Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 3 (1972), pp. 585-644.
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
While little systematic research has been directed toward 
analyzing the relationship between fiscal policy and the money 
supply, several studies provide some direct or indirect evidence 
on this relationship, although with one exception examination of this 
relationship was not the principal aim of these studies. The studies 
that will be reviewed in this chapter are those of J. H. Wood, A. F. 
Friedlaender, R. T. Froyen, J. A. Cacy, R. J. Gordon, and R. J. Barro.
I. Wood
The analytic framework utilized in this study is similar to 
the framework employed by Wood in a study of Federal Reserve behavior. 
Wood assumes that the Federal Reserve attempts to optimize a pref­
erence function which contains as arguments the weighted squared 
deviations of actual from desired values for the changes in real 
GNP, the rate of unemployment, the current surplus in the balance 
of payments^and the price level subject to its perception of the 
structure of the economy. The solution to this optimization prob­
lem yields an equation - the policy reaction function - that relates
12
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the Federal Reserve's policy instrument to the exogenous and lagged 
endogenous variables of the structural model.^
The structural model employed by Wood is a five equation 
model with equations for the changes in real output, the unemploy­
ment rate, the current surplus in the balance of payments, the price 
level, and the short-term interest rate. A summary measure of fiscal 
policy - the change in the annual cash surplus deflated by the whole­
sale price index - appears as an exogenous explanatory variable in 
all equations except the interest rate equation. A measure of the 
value of U.S. government securities held by the public appears as an 
explanatory variable in the interest rate equation, but there is no 
formal link between this variable and the fiscal policy variable.
The Federal Reserve's policy variable - assumed here to be free
reserves adjusted for changes in reserve requirements - appears in 
2each equation.
The final preference function used by Wood differs from the 
one described earlier. The function used in the empirical work 
contains two additional terms - the weighted squared short-term 
interest rate and the weighted squared volume of Federal Reserve 
purchases and sales of government securities adjusted for reserve
■Kj. H. Wood, "A Model of Federal Reserve Behavior," in G. 
Horwick, ed., Monetary Process and Policy (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1967), pp. 135-66.
^Wood, "A Model," p. 141.
14
requirement changes. In addition, the empirical function contains 
the weighted unemployment rate and the weighted squared price level, 
,not the weighted squared differences between actual and desired values 
for these variables. Wood thus assumes in his empirical work that the 
desired values for the changes in the price level, the interest rate, 
and the volume of securities bought and sold by the Federal Reserve 
are zero. In addition, Wood assumes that the Federal Reserve attempts 
to minimize the unemployment rate.
From the preference function and structural model described 
above, Wood derives a reaction function which relates the change in 
the volume of purchases and sales of government securities by the 
Federal Reserve to the exogenous and lagged endogenous variables in 
the structural model. Wood then estimates the reaction function by 
ordinary least squares utilizing quarterly data (with the exception 
of the fiscal policy measure which is on an annual basis) for the 
period 1952-63.4
Analysis of the coefficients in the estimated reaction function 
leads Wood to conclude that the Federal Reserve responds systematically 
to changes in real GNP, price level changes, changes in the volume of 
government securities held by the public, and changes in the balance 
of payments. The coefficient on the fiscal policy measure is positive,
^Wood, "A Model," p. 149.
4Wood, "A Model," p. 145-9.
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thereby implying that an expansionary fiscal policy change induces 
open market sales which should, ceteris paribus, reduce the money 
stock. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant.^ 
The use of annual data rather than quarterly data, by suppressing 
information about quarter to quarter movements in this variable, may 
result in a biased and inconsistent estimate of this coefficient. 
Furthermore, it would seem that the change in the volume of govern­
ment securities held by the public and the current stance of fiscal 
policy would be correlated in any period of time since the financing 
of a deficit or surplus affects the volume of securities outstanding. 
If this correlation exists, inclusion of both variables in the 
reaction function may introduce multicollinearity into the estimation 
process. Finally, the fiscal variable employed in this study may 
not be a good measure of the thrust of fiscal policy since it does 
not distinguish between policy-induced shifts in expenditures and 
tax receipts and changes in these variables resulting from changes 
in the level of economic activity. If the Federal Reserve responds 
to the economic effects of fiscal policy, then employment of a 
fiscal variable such as the annual cash surplus that does not 
accurately measure these economic effects is inappropriate.^ For
5Wood, "A Model," p. 153.
°A. S. Blinder and R. M. Solow, "Analytical Foundations of 
Fiscal Policy," in A. S. Blinder and R. M. Solow, et al., The Eco­
nomics of Public Finance (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1974), pp. 3-33.
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these reasons, it is hazardous to infer a positive relationship 
between fiscal policy and the monetary policy variable on the basis 
of the positive coefficient on the fiscal variable in the reaction 
function.
Thus the evidence on the fiscal-monetary policy link provided 
by the Wood study must be interpreted cautiously. The major contri­
bution of the Wood study to this study is the suggestion of a general 
framework within which the relationship between fiscal policy and 
the money supply can be analyzed.
II. Friedlaender
Friedlaender's study of macro policy goals also provides some 
evidence on the empirical relationship between fiscal policy and the 
money supply. Friedlaender's approach to this study is similar to 
Wood's study of Federal Reserve behavior. She assumes that a unified 
fiscal and monetary policy authority conducts monetary and fiscal 
policy so as to maximize a quadratic preference function subject to 
the structure of the economy. The preference function contains as 
arguments the weighted squared deviations of actual from desired 
values for the level of real GNP, the unemployment rate, the price 
level, the balance of trade, the short-term interest rate, and the 
government, budget surplus or deficit. The FRB-MIT econometric model 
serves as the structure of the economy. From this optimization prob­
lem Friedlaender derives and estimates reaction functions for both 
monetary and fiscal policy on a quarterly basis for the period
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1954-1964, a period which coincides almost exactly with the period 
of Wood's study.^
The difference between actual and desired net free reserves 
is employed as the dependent variable in the monetary policy reaction 
function. The coefficient on the fiscal policy variable (the actual 
surplus or deficit in the administrative budget) is positive but not 
statistically significant, thereby indicating that an increase in the 
surplus is associated with an expansion in the gap between actual and
O
desired net free reserves. The interpretation of this positive sign 
is ambiguous for the determination of the effect of fiscal policy 
upon the money supply. The increase in the gap associated with the 
rise in the surplus (or a fall in the deficit) could result from 
either a reduction in desired net free reserves with actual reserves 
constant or falling less than desired net free reserves or it could 
result from an expansion in actual net free reserves with desired 
reserves constant or rising less than actual net free reserves. If 
the rise in the surplus leads to an increase in desired net free 
reserves, monetary policy could be said to be accommodative, in the 
sense that the movement in the desired level of net free reserves 
is expected to generate economic effects of the same type as the fiscal 
action. On the other hand if the rise in the surplus leads to a
7A. F. Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals in the Postwar 
Period: A Study in Revealed Preference," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 87, 1 (February, 1973), pp. 25-43.
^Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals," p. 36.
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reduction In desired net free reserves, then monetary policy would be 
said to be nonaccommodative in the same sense as before.
Thus, the implications of the positive coefficient on the 
fiscal variable for the relationship between fiscal policy and the 
money supply is ambiguous. Furthermore, it should be noted that as 
in the Wood study, the fiscal variable employed does not distinguish 
between discretionary budget changes and budget changes induced by 
changes in the level of economic activity.
Finally, it should be noted that Friedlaender assumes that 
one authority conducts both monetary and fiscal policy so as to 
maximize one preference function. Given the separate nature of 
monetary and fiscal policymaking in the United States after the 
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, the assumption of a unified 
policy authority does not seem appropriate. The assumption of one 
preference function for both authorities is also inappropriate given 
the nature of United States macro policymaking. There is no reason 
that the preference function for both authorities should be.identical, 
particularly in light of Federal Reserve concern for financial market 
stability. Even if the preference functions contained the same 
variables, there is no inherent reason for the weights on these vari­
ables to be identical for the two authorities. Thus it might be 
argued that the Friedlaender framework does not represent the insti­
tutional reality of moentary and fiscal policymaking in the period 
under study.
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Thus because of the particular measures for fiscal and monetary 
policy that are employed in this study, and because of the assumptions 
made about the nature of monetary and fiscal policymaking, the empirical 
results of this study should be interpreted cautiously.
III. Froyen
A study of the endogeniety of monetary policy by Froyen also 
provides some evidence on the relationship between fiscal and monetary 
policy. Froyen estimates reaction functions for the Federal Reserve 
using monthly data over three separate periods of time demarked by 
changes in presidental administrations. The periods for estimation 
are February 1953 - January 1961, February 1961 - January 1969, and 
February 1969 - December 1972. Froyen uses two monetary policy vari­
ables as the dependent variables in the reaction functions - the 
monetary base and the monetary base minus borrowed reserves (hereafter 
referred to as the unborrowed monetary base). The gaps between the 
actual and desired unemployment rate, the actual and desired inflation 
rate, the actual and desired balance of payments surplus, lagged 
values of actual manufacturing and trade sales, the volume of pri­
vately held federal debt lagged one month, the change in the long-term 
corporate bond rate, and the full-employment surplus lagged one month 
are employed as explanatory variables. Almon lags are used for the 
lags on the gaps between the actual and desired unemployment rate, the
20
inflation rate, the balance of payments surplus, and on the sales 
ovariable.
Froyen suggests that one would expect a negative sign on the 
full-employment surplus since monetary policy has tended to accommo­
date fiscal policy in the postwar period. Furthermore, Froyen suggests 
that the coefficient on the volume of outstanding federal debt held 
by the private sector should be positive because of Federal Reserve 
concern for stability in the government securities market.^
The empirical evidence on the effect of fiscal policy upon the 
monetary policy variable is mixed. The coefficient on the full- 
employment surplus is negative and statistically significant only over 
the period February 1961-January 1969. These results hold for both 
monetary policy variables. In the other two periods, the coefficients 
on the fiscal variable are positive but not statistically significant. 
The coefficient on the volume of privately held federal debt is 
positive in every period but is statistically significant for both 
monetary variables only for the period February 1969-December 1972.
The coefficient is significant for the period February 1961-January 
1969 only when the monetary base is the dependent variable.^
9R. T. Froyen, "A Test of the Endogeniety of Monetary Policy," 
Journal of Econometrics, 2, 2 (July 1974), pp. 175-88.
^Froyen, "A Test," p. 178.
■^Froyen, "A Test," p. 182.
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Froyen concludes his study with the observation that macro- 
economic stabilization goals have significantly influenced Federal 
Reserve behavior in the past. The fiscal variable employed in this 
study is superior to the variables used in the Wood and Friedlaender 
studies. The evidence for the effect of fiscal policy upon the 
monetary policy variable is, however, mixed. The evidence suggests 
that in the period February 1961-January 1969 the Federal Reserve 
accommodated fiscal policy. In other periods the evidence is less 
suggestive since the coefficients on the fiscal variables are posi­
tive but not statistically significant.
IV. Cacy
The studies discussed up to this point have not focused 
directly upon the relationship between fiscal policy and the money 
supply. The evidence these studies have shed on this relationship 
has been a by-product of the pursuit of their primary research 
interests which varied from study to study. A study by Cacy has, 
however, focused directly upon the fiscal policy-money supply rela­
tionship. Cacy hypothesizes that the levels of certain monetary 
variables (M^, M 2 , the monetary base, member bank reserves, and the 
volume of U.S. securities held by the Federal Reserve) are affected 
by the current and previous federal budget deficits. Because of 
Federal Reserve concern for the effect of financing a deficit upon
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the level of interest rates, Cacy anticipates a positive relation­
ship between the monetary variables and the deficit.^
Cacy tests his hypotehsis by regressing the levels of the 
monetary variables on a proxy for the deficit, the level of net 
liabilities of the Treasury, over the period 1970-74. Each variable 
is seasonally adjusted and detrended, and lags of 18 and 24 months 
are employed in the regressions. Cacy reports a significant regres­
sion relation for with an 18-month lag (adjusted R^ = .28), M£ 
with both the 18 and 24 month lags (adjusted R s are .40 and .46
respectively), and the monetary base with a 24-month lag (adjusted 
oR = .58). However, the sums of the coefficients on net liabilities 
in the regressions for M^, M 2  with the 18 month lag, and the monetary 
base are negative. The sum of the coefficients on net liabilities 
for M 2  with the 24-month lag is positive. No significant regression 
relation is found for member bank reserves (adjusted R^ = .00).-^
Cacy concludes that the Federal Reserve did not try to 
offset the interest rate effects of the budget deficit. He suggests 
that the negative relationships found are due to private sector 
response to the deficit. This conclusion points out the hazards 
of estimating and interpreting "reduced form" equations. In
A. Cacy, "Budget Deficits and the Money Supply,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Monthly Review, June 1975, 
pp. 3-9.
^Cacy, "Budget Deficits," p. 7.
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another regression Cacy finds a positive relationship between a 
short-term interest rate (the commercial paper rate) and the 
budget deficit.^ Most studies of the money supply relation have 
found a positive relation between the level of the money stock 
and interest rates.^ If deficits do lead to interest rate 
increases and the response of the public and commercial banks 
to this increase results in an expansion of the money supply, 
then Cacy's interpretation of the regression results is inappro­
priate. As in many other "reduced form" studies, the interpretation 
of the results is made difficult by the lack of specification of 
a model of the economy.^
As noted in Chapter IV of this study, a negative relation­
ship between fiscal policy and the money supply is expected when 
Federal Reserve concern for macroeconomic stabilization goals 
dominates its concern for financial market stability. If this 
situation is found, then one would expect a negative relation 
between the fiscal measure and the Federal Reserve's policy 
variables. Two possible policy variables are included in the 
regressions run by Cacy. In the regression of the volume of
■^Cacy, "Budget Deficits," p. 8.
15See for example, R. L. Tiegen, "The Demand for and Supply 
of Money," in R. L. Tiegen, ed., Readings in Money, National Income, 
and Stabilization Policy, 4th ed. (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1978), pp. 69-81.
■^For a discussion of other problems with the "reduced form" 
approach, see Blinder and Solow, "Analytical Foundations," pp. 63-78 
and the references cited therein.
24
member bank reserves on the net liabilities measure, a significant 
regression relation is not found. In the regression of the monetary 
base on net liabilities, a significant negative relation is found
\
for the 24-month lag. However, as Cacy notes, the existence of 
autocorrelation makes the interpretation of the regression relation 
difficult."^ The evidence thus does not provide support for the 
supposition that the negative money supply-deficit relation is due 
to Federal Reserve response to the effects of the deficit.
Thus, the evidence provided by Cacy on the relationship 
between fiscal policy and the money supply is ambiguous. Some 
regressions provide weak support for a negative relationship, but 
a conclusion in favor of a negative relation does not receive support 
from the interest rate and monetary base regressions.
V. Gordon
An analysis of world inflation by Gordon yields some evidence 
on the fiscal policy - money supply relationship. Gordon suggests 
that a concern for stabilizing interest rates may lead the monetary 
authority to expand the money supply when a demand shock, such as 
an expansionary fiscal policy, hits the economy. Gordon tests the 
hypothesis of monetary accommodation of demand shocks by regressing
17Cacy, "Budget Deficits," p. 8.
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the growth rate of the money supply upon a fiscal policy variable, 
the money growth rate lagged one period, a wage rate variable, an 
output measure, an internationally traded-goods price index, and
\
an international reserves measure. The equation is estimated using 
quarterly data over the period from the third quarter 1958 to the 
first quarter 1973 and over the period from the third quarter 1958 
to the fourth quarter 1976. The fiscal measure employed is the 
residual from a regression of the actual federal deficit on the 
current and lagged values of real GNP. This measure is thus an 
improvement over the actual deficit since it eliminates, at least
in part, changes in the deficit related to changes in the level of
. . 18 economic activity.
For both estimation periods Gordon finds a negative relation
between the fiscal variable and the growth rate of the money supply.
However, the size of the coefficient varys significantly, changing
from -1.012 from 1958-1973 to -.169 from 1958-1976. The results
here suggest an offsetting rather than an accommodating relation-
1 9ship, but the relationship seems to be unstable. 7 Gordon s results 
should be interpreted cautiously, however, since the equation he 
is estimating is in effect a reaction function for the monetary 
authority. This equation is not derived from an explicit structural
18R. J. Gordon, "World Inflation and Monetary Accommodation 
in Eight Countries," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1977), 
pp. 409-77.
19Gordon, •'World Inflation," pp. 450-1.
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model assumed to represent the structure perceived by these
authorities. The equation estimated may thus be misspecified
^and if it is misspecified the coefficients may be biased and 
20inconsistent.
VI. Barro
A final study reviewed here that contributes some information
about the relationship between fiscal policy and the money supply
is Barro's study of the relationship between "unanticipated" money
growth and unemployment. Barro assumes that government expenditures
are financed through taxes and issuance of money. The financing mix
is arranged so as to minimize the costs of raising the revenue to
cover the expenditures. Barro asserts that with a given quantity
of tax-raising capital any increase in government expenditures is
financed through both tax increases and an increase in the growth
21rate of the money supply.
^^For a discussion of specification errors and the effects 
of these errors on the estimated coefficients, see J. Kmenta,
Elements of Econometrics (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1971), pp. 392-4.
21r . J. Barro, "Unanticipated Money Growth and Unemployment 
in the United States," American Economic Review, 67, 2 (March 1977), 
pp. 101-15.
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Barro estimates a money growth equation using annual data 
for the period 1941-73. The dependent variable is the growth rate 
of and the explanatory variables include the money growth rate 
lagged one and two periods, an unemployment rate variable lagged 
one period, and a federal government expenditure variable. The 
government expenditure variable is the difference between the log 
of real federal expenditures and the log of "normaln real federal 
expenditures. "Normal" real expenditures are generated from an 
adaptive mechanism which specifies that "normal" expenditures are 
an exponentially decaying distributed lag of the log of actual real 
federal expenditures. The fiscal variable employed is thus a measure 
of the deviation of actual from expected real federal expenditures. 
Barro finds a positive relationship between the fiscal measure and 
the growth rate of the money supply, thereby implying monetary 
accommodation of deviations of actual from normal growth in federal 
expenditures. Barro also enters both the log of current real expen­
ditures and the fiscal variable described above as separate arguments 
but finds that the coefficient on the log of actual expenditures is 
not significantly different from zero. He thus concludes that only 
deviations of actual from "normal" expenditures influence money supply 
growth.^
^Barro, "Unanticipated Money Growth," pp. 103-5.
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The theoretical basis for the inclusion of the fiscal vari­
able in the money supply growth equation, which presumably is the 
reduced form of some structural model, apparently rests upon the 
argument that an increase in federal expenditures will be financed 
in part through an expansion of the money supply. Barro thus 
implicitly assumes either that fiscal and monetary policy are con­
ducted by a single authority, "the" government, or else that the 
monetary authority is dominated by the fiscal authority. The latter 
assumption may be tenable over part of the sample period (1941-1950), 
but does not conform to the institutional reality of macroeconomic 
stabilization policies in the post-Accord period. While it is argued 
in Chapter III of this study that fiscal variables should appear in 
a monetary policy reaction function, justification of the inclusion 
of fiscal variables in such a function on deficit financing grounds 
is inappropriate for the United States in the post-Accord period.
Once this institutional feature of policy-making is recognized, 
the interpretation of the positive coefficient on the fiscal vari­
able in Barro's money growth equation is difficult without further 
knowledge of the structural model which implicitly lies behind 
this equation.
VII. Conclusion
With one exception (Cacy) the studies reviewed in this 
chapter have not focused primarily upon the relationship between 
fiscal policy and the money supply. In most cases this question
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is subsidiary to the primary interest of the study and this primary 
interest varies from study to study. It is thus not surprising that 
^the evidence on the fiscal policy-money supply relation provided by 
these studies is ambiguous and in some cases contradictory. Several 
studies - Wood, Cacy, Gordon, and Friedlaender - find a negative 
relationship between fiscal policy and either the money supply or a 
monetary policy variable, thereby implying that monetary policy 
actions tend to offset expansionary fiscal policy actions. Other 
studies - Froyen and Barro - find a positive relation between fiscal 
policy and either the money supply or a monetary policy variable, 
thereby implying that monetary policy actions tend to accommodate 
expansionary fiscal policy moves. However, it should be noted that 
the appropriateness of the fiscal variable may be questioned since 
many of the variables employed do not distinguish between discre­
tionary fiscal policy changes and changes in the fiscal variable 
induced by a change in economic activity.
In the following chapters we wish to analyze and estimate 
empirically the effect of fiscal policy upon monetary policy and 
ultimately the money supply. A basic premise of this study is that 
the money supply effects of fiscal policy can be properly analyzed 
only within a framework which recognizes the concern of the monetary 
authority for both macroeconomic stabilization goals and financial 
market stability goals and which specifies a structural model that 
allows analysis of the effects of fiscal policy upon the achievement
of these goals. Our attention is now directed toward this analysis 
and estimation in the chapters that follow.
CHAPTER III
MONETARY EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY WHEN 
FEDERAL RESERVE BEHAVIOR IS EXOGENOUS
I. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the theoretical 
links between fiscal policy and changes in the money supply. These 
links might be separated into two categories - direct and indirect. 
The direct links refer to the effects upon the money supply of the 
mode of financing the federal government’s budget as distinct from 
the effects of the budget and its financing upon economic variables 
that lead to changes in economic behavior that in turn affect the 
money supply. These modes of financing include (1) drawing down 
Treasury balances built up from past budget surpluses or from past 
borrowing in excess of previous deficits, (2) selling government 
securities to the Federal Reserve, (3) selling government securities 
to the non-bank public and/or to commercial banks, and (4) selling 
government securities to the non-bank public and/or to commercial 
banks accompanied by an equivalent open-market purchase by the . 
Federal Reserve.
The indirect links refer to changes in the money supply 
induced by adjustments in the spending and portfolio decisions of 
the non-bank public, commercial banks, and the Federal Reserve as a
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response to changes in market interest rates, income, wealth, and 
other economic variables induced by the current state of the federal 
budget and its financing. Federal Reserve "even-keeling" would thus 
be classified as an indirect link within this classificatory scheme. 
The indirect links will be analyzed in the context of a linear 
variant of an IS-LM model which incorporates endogenous tax receipts, 
inflationary expectations, and a government budget constraint. The 
indirect links with Federal Reserve behavior exogenous are examined 
in this chapter; the indirect links when Federal Reserve behavior 
is endogenous to the model are examined in the next chapter.
Direct links are examined first, and it is shown that these 
effects are of a trivial magnitude and can hereafter be ignored in 
this analysis. After the model is specified, expressions are derived 
for the change in the money supply induced by changes in government 
expenditures and the exogenous portion of tax receipts. We show 
that a rise in government expenditures unambiguously leads to an 
expansion in the money supply and that an exogenous increase in tax 
receipts unambiguously lowers the money supply.
II. Direct Links Between Fiscal Policy and the Money Supply
The direct links between fiscal policy and changes in the 
money supply can be treated briefly since, in general, these direct 
effects will be of a trivial magnitude. In analyzing these direct 
links, we assume that the federal budget is in deficit and that
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marginal reserve requirements at all commercial banks are the same. 
This latter assumption allows us to ignore changes in the money 
supply due to changes in the distribution of deposits and reserves 
within the banking system that result from the mode of financing 
the deficit. Our primary analytic concern is whether the mode of 
financing as distinct from its effects upon economic variables such 
as interest rates significantly changes the volume of deposits and 
reserves within the banking system and hence changes the money 
supply.
A. Financing Through Drawdown of Treasury Balances at the Federal 
Reserve
If the Treasury draws down its balances at the Federal 
Reserve, then, ceteris paribus, the money supply will expand as 
deposits are transferred from the Treasury, whose deposits are not 
included in the money supply, to the public, whose deposits are, 
of course, included in the money supply. Furthermore, the monetary 
base will expand as Treasury balances at the Federal Reserve fall. 
If, however, Treasury balances are rebuilt through the sale of 
securities to the public or through tax collections, the money 
supply and monetary base will contract as deposits are shifted 
from the public to the Treasury in payment for the securities or 
in payment of taxes. The initial change in the money supply and 
monetary base may also be offset (partially or fully) through 
Federal Reserve open-market sales. Typically, changes in Treasury
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balances at the Federal Reserve are taken as a technical factor 
which the Federal Reserve acts to offset.
If Treasury balances are quickly rebuilt and if the Federal 
Reserve "defends" against changes in the money supply and the mone­
tary base due to this mode of finance, the effects upon the money 
supply and reserves in the system will be short-lived and will be 
of a trivial magnitude. Empirical evidence on Federal Reserve 
response to the drawdown of Treasury balances has been provided 
by Lombra and Torto.^ They found that changes in the monetary 
base induced by a reduction in Treasury balances are at least 
partially offset by open-market sales. Thus we might conclude 
that typically the effects upon the money supply and monetary base 
are partially offset by Federal Reserve actions. Empirical evi­
dence on the rebuilding of Treasury balances and the statistical
relationship between changes in Treasury balances and changes in
2M-̂  has been provided by Hamblin. Hamblin found that Treasury
balances fluctuate widely from week to week, with declines being
3followed by rebuilding of these balances. Furthermore, in
% .  E. Lombra and R. G. Torto, "Federal Reserve 'Defensive 
Behavior' and the Reverse Causation Argument," Southern Economic 
Journal, 40, 1 (July 1973), p. 51.
^M. Hamblin, "Treasury Deposits and the Money Supply," 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Monthly Review, February 1977, 
pp. 14-20.
^Hamblin, "Treasury Deposits," Chart 1, p. 16.
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regressions of the change in on changes in Treasury deposits 
at the Federal Reserve, Hamblin found weak statistical relation­
ships for weekly data (R^ = .17), monthly data (R^ = .13), and 
for quarterly data (R^ = .10).^ This short-lived money supply 
effect of changes in Treasury balances has also been noted by Hansen.**
The evidence cited above is consistent with the conclusion 
that any effects of financing a deficit through the drawdown of 
Treasury balances upon the money supply are short-lived and are 
therefore of negligible interest for this study since we focus 
upon quarterly periods as the basic period of analysis.
B. Financing Through the Sale of Government Securities to the 
Federal Reserve
The sale of securities directly to the Federal Reserve by 
the Treasury, which would increase the money supply and reserves 
in the banking system as Treasury balances created in the sale are 
spent, also has negligible effects upon the money supply. At any 
given time, the Treasury is allowed by U.S. statute to borrow a 
maximum of $5 billion directly from the Federal Reserve. However, 
in the few occasions in which this has occurred in the past, direct
borrowing has typically been limited to special Treasury certificates
^Hamblin, "Treasury Deposits," Table 1, p. 17.
-*B. Hansen, "On the Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A




which were to be repaid within a few days of issue. Thus this 
mode of finance can be ruled out as having any significant direct 
effects upon the money supply.
C. Financing Through the Sale of Government Securities to the 
Non-Bank Public and/or to Commercial Banks
The sale of securities to the non-bank public and/or to
commercial banks generally has negligible effects upon the money
supply and the monetary base. Sale of securities to the non-bank
public reduces the balances of the non-bank public but results in
an increase in Treasury balances at commercial banks; the money
supply is thus reduced at this point. When the Treasury balances
are transferred to the Federal Reserve, reserves in the system
fall, but these reserves are restored and the original decline
in the non-bank public’s balances is reversed when these balances
7are spent by the Treasury.
The sale of securities to commercial banks would likewise 
have no money supply effects if the purchase by the banks were 
financed through a sale of an equivalent amount of other assets 
held by the banks. In this case, the reduction in the deposits of
6The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions, 6th
ed. (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 
September 1974), p. 66.
^It should be noted that the primary purpose of the 
Treasury's holding deposits at the Federal Reserve and at com­
mercial banks (tax and loan accounts) is to reduce the effect 
of government financing actions upon bank reserves and interest 
rates. See P. Brockschmidt, "Treasury Cash Balances," Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Monthly Review, July-August 1975, 
pp. 12-13.
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the non-bank public stemming from the banks' sale of assets would 
offset the money supply effects of the Treasury expenditures and 
the money supply would not change.
If the bank's purchase of the securities were financed 
through a drawdown of excess reserves or through increased^borrowing 
at the Federal Reserve, Treasury expenditure of the proceeds of the 
security sale would change the money supply. If commercial banks 
rebuilt excess reserves or repaid the borrowing at the Federal 
Reserve through a sale of other assets, then the initial money 
supply effects would be reversed and the money supply would have 
risen only temporarily. However, if the security sales alter 
economic variables such as market interest rates that affect banks 
willingness to hold excess reserves or to borrow from the Federal 
Reserve, then commercial banks may not fully rebuild excess reserves 
and may extend their borrowing from the Federal Reserve. In this 
instance, the money supply will not return to its initial level.
The money supply effect in this case results from a change in banks' 
portfolio behavior as a result of the change in market interest 
rates and, under the classificatory scheme outlined in the intro­
duction, is properly classified as an indirect link between fiscal 
policy and the money supply.
Thus we can conclude that the third mode of financing the 
deficit will not have any direct effects upon the money supply but 
may, through effects upon market variables that affect private
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behavior, have an indirect effect upon the money supply. This 
indirect effect is examined later in this chapter.
•v
D . Financing Through the Sale of Government Securities to the
Non-Bank Public and/or Commercial Banks Accompanied by Federal 
Reserve Open-Market Purchases
The sale of securities by the Treasury accompanied by an 
equivalent open-market purchase by the Federal Reserve was effec­
tively eliminated as a viable mode of finance by the Treasury - 
Federal Reserve Accord of 1951. In the period 1942-1951, Federal 
Reserve pegging of interest rates led to Federal Reserve purchase 
of all securities offered to it by private holders; in effect the
Federal Reserve monetized any Treasury sales of securities in
0
order to prevent interest rates from rising. The automatic 
response of the Federal Reserve to movements in interest rates 
was eliminated by the Accord of 1951. This Accord has been widely 
interpreted to mean that the Federal Reserve was freed to conduct 
monetary policy so as to achieve the goals specified in the Employ­
ment Act of 1946. For example, Chandler and Goldfeld suggest that 
the Accord's " . . .  longer-run purpose was to work toward a situation 
in which its open-market policies.would be shaped almost exclu­
sively by economic stabilization objectives, and its purchases and 
sales would again be directed exclusively toward regulating the
®L. V. Chandler and S. M. Goldfeld, The Economics of Money 
and Banking, 7th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 555-
564.
Qreserve position of the banking system . . . ." As a result of 
this change in the orientation of monetary policy, the monetiza­
tion of Treasury securities sales was eliminated as an acceptable 
method of financing a deficit.
We may, however, observe a federal government budget deficit 
and a simultaneous open market purchase by the Federal Reserve.^
In the post-Accord period, this simultaneity is presumably the 
outcome of a Federal Reserve decision that fiscal policy has not 
been expansive enough or that a rise in market intrest rates gene­
rated by the sale of securities by the Treasury is unacceptable.
This change in security holdings by the Federal Reserve is properly 
classified as an indirect link between fiscal policy and changes in 
the money supply. Federal Reserve response to the deficit will be 
analyzed in Chapter IV when the Federal Reserve is treated as 
endogenous.
The central argument of the discussion presented above is 
that the financing of the deficit - whether through temporary draw­
down of Treasury balances or through sale of securities - has no 
significant money supply effects other than the effects resulting 
from changes in market variables that lead to changes in private 
sector or Federal Reserve behavior that in turn affect the money
9Chandler and Goldfeld, The Economics of Money and Banking,
p. 567.
^®T. D. Simpson, Money, Banking, and Economic Analysis 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 248.
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supply. Thus the remaining analysis will concentrate upon the 
indirect effects of the deficit upon the money supply and the 
direct links will hereafter be ignored.
III. Specification of the IS-LM Model
effects of fiscal policy upon the money supply are examined within 
the context of a model of the macroeconomy. This model is also 
employed in the next chapter as representative of the Federal 
Reserve's perception of the structure of the economy.
The equations of the model are:
Product Market
(3.1) Cfc = a^ + - Tfc) + a2 WEt> (consumption function)
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the indirect
g
(3.2) WE = (fE.) + (_£.) + Bt, (wealth definition)
t t
(3.3) !t - bQ + +
(investment function)
(3.4) E = Et , (export function)
(3.5) IMt = cQ + c ^ , (import function)
(3.6) Gfc = Gt , (government expenditure 
function)
(3.7) It - r 0 + r1Yt (net tax function)
(3.8) Yfc » Ct + It + Gt + Et - IMt, (equilibrium condition)
Money Market
(3.9) M° = £0 + + £2Yt + f3^ , (money demand function)
(3.10) tij! = g0 + gjl” + g2l”S + g3UBRt> (money supply function)
(3.11) i f  . If, (discount rate function)
(3.12) UBRt « UBRt, (unborrowed reserves 
function)
(3.13) 1* = hQ + + h2Yt, (term structure of 
interest rates 
function)
(3.14) M® = M f (equilibrium condition)
Phillips Curve Relation
(3.15) Pt = j() + J ^ )  + J2(-|i_) + JsP«. (Phillips Curve 
function)
* 00 1 
(3.16) P? = (l-£) Z, An" P , t n=l t-n (price expectations function)
Aggregate Price Level
(3.17) Pt = P ^ d  + Pt), (price level definition)
where:
= nominal income,
dYt_^ = change in Y from period t-2 to t-1,
POTYfc = nominal potential income,
= nominal consumption expenditures,
= nominal investment expenditures,
= nominal government expenditures on goods and services,




= a representative nominal short-term market interest rate,
= a representative nominal long-term market interest rate,
= nominal net wealth,
= nominal value of net dividend payments to the public by 
domestic corporations,
= nominal value of the economy’s capital stock,
= nominal monetary base,
= volume of perpetual government securities with an interest 
payment of $l/year held by the public,
= nominal value of government securities held by the public,
nominal demand for money (M^), 
nominal supply of money (M^),
Federal Reserve discount rate,
nominal volume of unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve 
requirement changes,
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P = aggregate price level,
•
Pt = inflation rate,
= expected inflation rate, and 
Ut = total unemployment rate.
The subscript t refers to the time period under consideration. 
A bar over a variable (for example, UBRt) indicates that the vari­
able is exogenous. In the present formulation of the model the
endogenous variables are Yt , Ct, It, IMt> Tt, WEfc, M^, ME, i£, Pt,
•EPfc, and Pt. The exogenous and lagged endogenous variables in this
S Zformulation of the model are Kt, Gt> Bt> it_ 2 > ^Yt-1’ It-1’ ®t*
iES, UBRt, Ufc, Y*0T, and Pt_n (n = 1, . . .,«>).
Before examining the consumption equation, it is necessary 
to consider the definition of net wealth employed in the model.
Nominal net wealth is defined as the sum of the value of the capi­
tal stock, the nominal value of the monetary base, and the nominal 
value of government securities held by the public. The nominal
value of the capital stock might be measured by the nominal value
of the ownership claims to this stock of capital. The value of 
these equities then depends upon expected earnings and the discount 
rate applied to the earnings. Assuming for simplicity that capital 
is a perpetuity and that the expected returns in the current and 
all future periods are equal, we can write the value of the capital 
stock in the current period as (Kt/it) where is a measure of
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the expected earnings from the stock of capital. The value of the 
capital stock can thus change because of a change in expected returns 
(assumed to be exogenous) or because of a change in the long-term 
interest rate.^ The nominal value of the monetary base and the 
stock of government securities held by the public represents the 
liabilities of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to the public 
and are hence counted as private sector wealth.
12The inclusion of the monetary base is uncontroversial;
however, it has been argued that the value of demand deposits should
13be added to the monetary base and included in net wealth. The case 
for inclusion of demand deposits in net wealth rests upon the argu­
ment that since banks are prevented from paying explicit interest 
on demand deposits, and since banks in competitive markets would 
pay interest on demand deposits, banks earn monopoly profits. How­
ever, these monopoly profits should be reflected in the value of 
the bank's stock. Furthermore, banks pay implicit interest on 
demand deposits; thus even if banks were not required to hold 
reserves against demand deposits, the value of the bank to its 
owners would not increase on a one-for-one basis with increases
■^L. A. Meyer, "Wealth Effects and the Effectiveness of 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
6, 4 (November 1974), p. 488.
12AASee for example, D. Patinkin, Money, Interest, and Prices, 
2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 289.
1 1AJSee for example, B. Pesek and T. Saving, Money, Wealth, 
and Economic Theory (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 79-102.
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in demand deposits because of the implicit interest payments made 
by the bank."^ Therefore, demand deposits will not be included
as net wealth for the purposes of this analysis and will be con­
sidered as representing an asset of the non-bank public which is 
fully offset by an equivalent liability of banks.
Furthermore, it is often argued that the value of government
securities should not be included as net wealth because individuals
anticipate higher tax payments in the future to pay interest on the
bonds, and the discounted value of these tax payments is thought to
exactly offset the current value of the government securities. It
has also been suggested that while some discounting takes place
the public does not fully discount the anticipated future taxes
and hence some fraction of the value of government securities out-
15standing should be included as net wealth. However, the usual 
assumption that the public does not anticipate higher tax rates 
to pay bond interest will be followed in this paper and the entire 
value of government securities in the hands of the public will be 
included as net wealth. Thus net wealth can be written as:
K GS
“ t ' + ("T> + Bf
t t
The consumption function relates the level of nominal con­
sumption expenditures to the key determinants of these expenditures,
•^D. Patinkin, "Money and Wealth," in D. Patinkin, Studies 
in Monetary Economics, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 168-94.
■^Patinkin, Money, Interest, and Prices, p. 289.
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and the function employed in this model is in the spirit of the 
Ando-Modigliani life-cycle consumption function. Ando-Modigliani 
begin from the assumption that individuals maximize their lifetime 
consumption stream subject to the constraint that the present value 
of consumption equals the present value of the individual's human 
and non-human earnings. From this starting point and based upon a 
number of other assumptions, Ando-Modigliani develop an aggregate
consumption function that contains current labor income and net
16wealth lagged one period as arguments in the function. For sim­
plicity, current income will be substituted for current labor income 
and current net wealth will be substituted for net wealth lagged 
one period in the consumption function employed in this model. The 
coefficient of current labor income, a^, is greater than zero but 
less than one, as is the coefficient for net wealth, a2 « The Ando- 
Modigliani model implies that the coefficient for net wealth will 
be small since an increase in net wealth is an addition to a stock 
and consumption from this change in net wealth will be spread over 
the lifetime of an individual. Thus the model suggests that a2  is 
less than ai; empirical research bears out this theoretical expec­
tation.^
The investment function relates the level of investment 
expenditures to the hypothesized key determinants of these
■^A. Ando and F. Modigliani, "The 'Life-Cycle' Hypothesis 
of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests," American Economic
Review, 53, 1 (March 1963), pp. 56-9.
■^Ando and Modigliani, "The 'Life-Cycle' Hypothesis," 
pp. 60 and 64.
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expenditures, and the investment function employed in this model draws 
from several different theories of investment behavior. The Jorgenson 
model of aggregate investment behavior suggests that the rental rate 
per unit of capital adjusted for the price level is an important deter­
minant of the firm’s desired capital stock; through its effect upon 
the level of the desired capital stock, the rental rate exerts an in­
fluence upon net investment by the firm. The rental rate is affected 
by the long-term rate of interest, the depreciation rate, the tax rate 
appropriate to the firm, the proportion of depreciation expense deduc­
tible from the firm's tax bill, and the proportion of interest cost
18deductible from the tax bill. If all elements of the rental rate 
other than the long-term rate of interest change slowly or are con­
stant, then most of the changes in the real rental rate can be attri­
buted to changes in the long-term interest rate, and the long-term 
interest rate, which is readily observable, can be used as a proxy 
for changes in the rental rate. It is assumed in this study that the 
long-term interest rate is a proxy for the rental rate. The Jorgenson 
investment model as modified here implies that the interest rate affects
investment expenditures with a lag; the form and length of this lag
19is, however, an empirical question. The expected sign of the coef­
ficient on the long-term interest rate, b^, is negative.
18D. W. Jorgenson, "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior," 
American Economic Review, 53, 2(May 1963), pp. 248-9.
19The long-term interest rate lagged two periods gave the 
best fit for the investment equation (see Chapter V of this study).
For this reason the long-term rate lagged two periods is employed
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One can also argue that the level of investment is deter­
mined in part by the firm's expectations about future levels of 
sales and that these expectations are in part related to past changes 
in sales. The change in sales from period t-2 to t-1 affects the 
firm's expectations of the change in sales from t-1 to t; this latter 
expected change affects the firm's desired level of the capital stock, 
and hence investment, in period t. If the firm forms its expec­
tations in this manner, then an accelerator variable should be
20included in the investment equation. The change in output from 
t-2 to t-1 is employed as the accelerator variable in this model. 
Furthermore, the level of investment is in part influenced by the 
level of current output, ^  and this explanatory variable is also 
included in the investment equation in this model. The expected
in the IS-LM model. This finding is in accord with previous studies. 
See for example, J. R. Moroney and J. M. Mason, "The Dynamic 
Impacts of Autonomous Expenditures and the Monetary Base on Aggre­
gate Income," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 3, 4 (November 
1971), p. 798 and the studies referenced therein.
^ S e e  for example, D. J. Ott, A. F. Ott, and J. H. Yoo, 
Macroeconomic Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 93-110.
The inclusion of an accelerator variable is consistent with the 
Jorgenson investment model. See Jorgenson, "Capital Theory," 
pp. 248-51.
0*1AAIn the Jorgenson approach to investment behavior, the level 
of output affects the level of the desired capital stock and hence 
investment. See Jorgenson, "Capital Theory," p. 249. Furthermore, 
as noted by Ackley, the accelerator model can be formulated in terms 
of the level of output. See G. Ackley, Macroeconomics: Theory and
Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 644-7.
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sign on the accelerator coefficient, b 2 » is positive as is the 
expected sign of the output coefficient,
Finally, many studies have shown that the adjustment of 
actual investment to the desired rate of investment takes more than 
one quarter. ^  The gradual adjustment of actual to desired invest­
ment may be due to technological constraints in implementing the 
investment plans. The effect of gradual adjustment upon the invest­
ment equation is now demonstrated. The discussion of investment 
expenditures up to this point can be summarized in an equation of 
the following sort
I? = b* + b* iZ „ + b*dY + b*Y where t 0 1 t-2 2 t-1 3 t
D ZI^ = desired investment in period t, i,_ dY „, and Y are as t r t-2* t-1 t
defined previously, and the b*, i = 1, 2, 3, are the coefficients
on the explanatory variables. The relationship between actual
investment, I., and desired investment, I?, can be written as t t
I. - I . = v(ID - I„ ,). That is, the difference between actual t t—1 t t—-1-
investment in the current and previous periods is proportional to 
the gap between desired investment in the current period and actual 
investment in the previous period, v is the adjustment coefficient 
and indicates the rate of adjustment of actual to desired investment.
22C. W. Bischoff, "Business Investment in the 1970’s: A
Comparison of- Models," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1 
(1971), pp. 13-58.
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Rearranging this equation we obtain I? a I I. - (i^L) I. ,. Sub-C y  L y  L-X
stituting from the equation for desired investment we obtain Ifc = 
vbg + vbji^_2 + vb^dYt_1 + vb§Yt + (l-v)^^. Letting vbg = bQ ,
vb* = b., vb* = b , vb* = b , and (1-v) = b,, we obtain the invest-^ A J J
ment equation described earlier in this chapter
rt - b0 + biit-2 + b2dYt-l + b3Yt + V t - r
The expected sign of the coefficient on the level of investment in
the previous quarter is positive.
Exports are taken as exogenous in the model employed in this
study since exports are only a small part of total output of the U.S.
economy and are influenced in the short-run by the rate of economic
23activity in foreign countries and by negotiated trade agreements.
Imports are taken as endogenous to the model with current income as
the chief determinant of the level of imports. The expected sign
of the coefficient on current income, c^, is positive.
Government expenditures are assumed to be exogenous. Since
the inside lag in the implementation of changes in government expen-
24ditures has been estimated as greater than three months, the
^Moroney and Mason, "The Dynamic Impacts," p. 799.
Fels, "The Recognition Lag and Semi-Automatic Stabili­
zers ," Review of Economics^and Statistics, 45, 3 (August 1963) 
pp. 280-5.
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assumption of exogenous government expenditure is thought to be 
reasonable in the context of a quarterly model. The same assumption 
cannot be made for net tax receipts since, with a given tax rate 
structure and given structure of transfer payments, changes in 
income will produce variations in net tax receipts. Net taxes 
are assumed to be related to the level of income, and the coefficient 
on income, r-̂ , is assumed to be positive. It should be noted that 
changes in either the tax rate structure or in the structure of 
transfer payments will change the value of this coefficient.
The equilibrium condition for the product market merely 
states that the current level of nominal income depends upon the 
current levels of nominal consumption expenditures, nominal invest­
ment expenditures, nominal government expenditures, and nominal net
exports (E,. - IM ). It should be noted, however, that because of c t
the specific formulation of the investment function, lagged values
of investment expenditure and nominal income affect the current level
of nominal income.
The money demand function employed here can be written in
general form as: M^ = £(i™» Yt, P®). This general form is broadly
consistent with a number of different theoretical and empirical
25approaches to the demand for money, although in many instances
25see for example, S. M. Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money 
Revisited," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3 (1973), pp. 576- 
638; A. Meltzer, "The Demand for Money: The Evidence from the Time
Series," Journal of Political Economy, 71, 3 (June 1963), pp. 219-46; 
M. Friedman, "The Quantity Theory of Money - A Restatement," in
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the scale variable employed is either permanent income or net
wealth. The scale variable employed here will be current nominal
income. The specific form of the money demand function utilized
in * fin this study is linear in i , Y , and P*;. The money demand functionw u u
can thus be written as = f^ + + ^2^t exPecte<*
sign of the coefficient on i™ is negative (economic units economize
on money balances as the opportunity cost of holding these balances
rises), the expected sign of the coefficient on Yt is positive (as
the scale variable expands economic units expand their holdings of
all normal goods, to include money balances), and the expected sign
• Eof the coefficient on P is negative ( the expected rate of infla­
tion can be viewed as the rate of return on physical goods so that 
as the expected rate of inflation rises economic units retrench their 
holdings of money balances).
One might object to the inclusion of both the nominal short­
term rate and the expected rate of inflation as explanatory variables 
in the money demand function' as redundant. Economic theory suggests 
that nominal market interest rates reflect (at least partially) 
anticipated inflation. However, many empirical studies of the rela­
tionship between anticipated inflation and nominal interest rates 
have found that anticipated inflation affects these interest rates
M. Friedman, ed., Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 3-21; and D. E. W. 
Laidler, The Demand for Money. 2nd ed. (New York: Dun-Donnelley
Publishing Corp., 1977), pp. 49-98.
26with a coefficient of less than unity. Thus nominal market rates
may not fully reflect anticipated inflation rates. If this is the
case, a direct effect of anticipated inflation on the demand for
money is possible even though anticipated inflation indirectly affects
this demand through its effects upon nominal market interest rates.
Recent empirical tests of a money demand function that includes both
nominal interest rates and expected inflation as explanatory vari-
27 'ables have found both variables to be significant. Based upon 
these empirical results, both nominal interest rates and expected 
inflation will be included as explanatory variables in the money 
demand function.
For convenience, the money demand function will be written 
in inverse form and rearranged so that i^ is the dependent variable. 
Performing the necessary manipulations, we obtain the following 
equation which will be utilized in the remainder of this paper
(3.18) i” = f J + fjM^ + fjYfc + f^P®
where
f0 = ^ W ’ fl = f2 = - < V V ’ and f3 = " (f3/fl)#
26see for example, D. Laidler and M. Parkin, "Inflation: A
Survey," The Economic Journal, 85, 34 (December 1975), pp. 771-2 and 
the articles cited therein.
27See for example, Goldfeld, "The Demand for Money Revisited," 
pp. 577-638; A. A. Shapiro, "Inflation, Lags, and the Demand for 
Money," International Economic Review, 14, 1 (February 1973), pp. 81- 
96; and J. Melitz, "Inflationary Expectations and the French Demand 
for Money, 1959-70," Manchester School, 44, 1 (March 1976), pp. 17-41.
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The linear money supply function utilized in this model can
be derived from the following model which relates the level of 
(currency plus demand deposits) to the level of unborrowed reserves 
and the multiplier for unborrowed reserves. Since the ultimate 
concern of this paper is focused upon the effects of fiscal policy 
upon the money supply, the money supply function is developed in 
greater detail than any of the other functions in this model. A 
model which has as a special case a linear money supply function is 
now developed.
The behavioral relationships of the model are
(3.19) Ct/DDt = k(i™, i™, Y fc),
(3.20) TDt/DDt = td(i®, i™, Yt),
(3.21) GDt/DDt = g,
(3.22) XRt/DDt = e(i™), and
(3.23) BRt/DDt = b(i“ , i°S).
The identities of the model are
(3.24) B. = UBR. + BR,. + C„, t t c t’




Ct = currency holdings of the non-bank in period t,
DDfc = volume of demand deposits in period t,
TDt = volume of time deposits in period t,
GDt = volume of Federal government deposits in period t,
XRt = volume of excess reserves in period t,
BRt = volume of borrowed reserves in period t,
Bt = monetary base in period t,
UBRt = volume of unborrowed reserves in period t,
UBB^ = volume of the unborrowed monetary base in period t,
RR^jj  ̂= volume of required reserves on demand deposits in period t
= rDDtDDt»
RR̂ ,p t = volume of required reserves on time deposits in period t
rTDtTDt»
RR, . = volume of required reserves on government deposits in period CjU y C
C = rGD,tGDf
rDD t = weighted fractional-reserve requirement on DDt,
rTD t = weiShted ^racti°nal“reserve requirement on TDt,
rGD t = weighted fractional-reserve requirement on GDt =» r ^
i™ = a representative short-term market interest rate in period t,
TDi. = interest rate on TD,., t t’
DSifc = Federal Reserve discount rate in period t, and
Yt = nominal income in period t.
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The behavioral relationships explain the movement of the 
Ct/DDt, TDt/DDt, GD /DDfc, XRt/DDt, and BRt/DDt ratios. As will 
be seen later, changes in these ratios affect the unborrowed reserve 
multiplier and hence affect the level of M^. The following assump­
tions are made with respect to the signs of the partial derivatives 
of the ratios listed in (3.19) - (3.23) ^
3k/3im < 0, 3k/3iTD < 0, 3k/3Y > 0,
3td/3im < 0, 3td/3iTD > 0, 3td/3Y > 0,
3e/3im < 0, 3b/3im >0, and 3b/3iDS < 0.
The GDt/DDt ratio is assumed to be exogenous since movements in this 
ratio depend mainly upon the timing of receipts and expenditures by 
the Treasury and less upon movements in market variables.
OQ^°The assumptions made are consistent with theory and 
generally consistent with the available empirical evidence. See 
for example, W. R. Hosek and F. Zahn, Monetary Theory, Policy, and 
Financial Markets (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), pp. 82-104. The
empirical evidence for the sign of 3k/3im is mixed. For empirical 
studies that support the contention that 3k/3im < 0, see for example 
W. R. Hosek, "Determinants of the Money Multiplier," Quarterly Review 
of Economics and Business, 10, 2 (Summer 1970), pp. 37-46, and A.
Hess, "An Explanation of Short-Run Fluctuations in the Ratio of 
Currency to Demand Deposits," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
3, 3 (August 1971), pp. 666-79. For an empirical study that finds 
3k/3im > 0 see W. E. Becker, Jr., "Determinants of the United States 
Currency-Demand Deposit Ratio," Journal of Finance, 30, 1 (March 1975), 
pp. 57-74. However, since most studies find 3k/3im < 0, this assump­
tion will be maintained.
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Utilizing identities (3.25) and (3.26) and suppressing for 
convenience the time subscript we can write
UBB » RRpjj + RRjjj + RRGd + XR + C - BR.
Dividing by DD and substituting from (3.19) - (3.23) into this 
equation we obtain
Rearranging, we obtain
UBB = [rDD + rTDtd(im , iTD, Y) + r ^ g  + e(ira) + k(im , iTD, Y) 
- b(im , iDS)]DD.
Solving for DD, we obtain:
DD = [' 1 ](UBB)
rDD+rDDg+rTDtd(im* iT° ,Y)+e(im)+k(im ,iTD,Y)-b(im ,iDS)
An expression for can now be derived by utilizing the 
definition = DD + C. Thus we have
M = [1 + kCim ,iTD,Y)]DD.
Substituting the expression for DD derived earlier we obtain
r̂DD+rDD®+rTDt^ ^ m ''1' >J- ,Y)-b(im ,i^)
•] (UBB).
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The responsiveness of M-̂  to a changes in im , iDS, UBR and UBR 
can now be derived. The remaining analysis will focus upon these 
variables. For notational convenience let [rDD + rDDg + rTDtd(im ,
iTD, Y) + e(im ) + k(im , iTD, Y) - b(im , iDS)] = A and [1 + k(im ,
TDi , Y)] = E. The expression for can now be written as
= msUBB where ms = EA~^.
The partial derivative of M^ with respect to im is given by
3M1
-  = - (rTD ™  A-1UBB.
Based upon a priori expectations and the results of most empirical
models of the money supply, the sign of the derivative can be deter­
mined in the following manner. In evaluating the expression in
brackets [ ] we find that 3k/3im (l-ms) is > 0 since 3k/3im < 0 and
[1-ms] < 0 since E > 1 and A ^ > 1, and that (rTTJL!l! + -§i=—  - iOl_) < 0
3im 3im 3im
since < 0, < 0, and > 0 . ^  ms is > 0 so that the
3im 3im 3im
29 -1In evaluating the expression EA , we find the proposition
E > 1 to be uncontroversial since the C/DD ratio is positive and 
E = 1 + C/DD. The assertion that A“1 > 1 is subject to empirical 
refutation since one might conceive of a situation where the expec­
tation is that A~1 < 1. However, the available empirical evidence 
supports the original assertion that A--*- > 1. See for example, D. 
Fand, "Some Implications of Money Supply Analysis," American Economic 
Review, 57, 2 (May 1967), pp. 380-400; K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, 
"Some Further Investigations of Demand and Supply Functions for 
Money," Journal of Finance, 19, 2 (May 1964), pp. 240-83; R. L. 
Tiegen, "Demand and Supply Functions for Money in the United States: 
Some Structural Estimates," Econometrica, 32, 4 (October 1964),
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3M,
expression in brackets [ ] is > 0. Thus ---  > 0 so that forces
3im
which cause short-term interest rates to rise - such as expansionary 
fiscal policy - lead to an induced expansion in the money supply.
The responsiveness of to changes in the Federal Reserve's 
policy instruments can also be determined within this model. The 
volume of unborrowed reserves (UBR), a component of UBB, was selected 
as the chief instrument of monetary control. It was felt that 
changes in unborrowed reserves were dominated more by Federal Reserve 
actions than were other possible measures (the unborrowed monetary 
base or the monetary base), and, in fact, this is the variable used 
in most large-scale econometric models of the e c o n o m y . ^  Another
pp. 476-509; W. E. Gibson, "Demand and Supply Functions for Money in 
the United States: Theory and Measurement," Econometrica, 40, 2
(March 1972), pp. 361-70; R. L. Tiegen, "Demand and Supply Functions 
for Money: Another Look at Theory and Measurement," Econometrica,
44, 2 (March 1976), pp. 377-85; and R. Rasche, "A Review of Empirical 
Studies of the Money Supply Mechanism," Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review, 54, 7 (July 1972), pp. 11-19.
•^The theoretical arguments for this assertion have not, 
however, been accepted uncritically. See for example, F. deLeeuw 
and J. Kalchbrenner, "Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their
Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization - Comment," Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 51, 4 (April 1969), pp. 6-11, and 
L. C. Andersen and J. C. Jordan, "Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A
Test of Their Relative Importance in Economic Stabilization - Reply," 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 51, 4 (April 1969), pp. 
12-16.
For a detailed analysis of various monetary and reserve vari­
ables that the Federal Reserve could use in giving instructions to 
the Open Market Committee see R. G. Davis, "Short-Run Targets for 
Open Market Operations," in Open Market Policies and Operating Pro­
cedures - Staff Studies (Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, July 1971), pp. 37-69.
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policy instrument, the discount rate, is assumed to be exogenous.
It is felt that this assumption is justified by the fact that
borrowed reserves are a small portion of total reserves, by the
fact that the Federal Reserve does not generally use the discount
rate as an active tool for achieving its major objectives, and by
the fact that changes in the discount rate tend to follow changes
31in short-term market interest rates. Finally, reserve require­
ments are assumed to be exogenous since this is an infrequently
applied policy tool.
The partial derivative of with respect to UBR is given by 
the following expression
3M1 0 0.m
   ms + iSE. —  ■ UBR.3UBR 3im 3UBR
Since a change in UBR will, in general, affect market rates of
interest and since a change in market interest rates will affect ms,
. . »nimust include the term (£515.) (£±— ) in the expression for — ±— . An..m 9UBR 3UBR
increase in UBR will reduce ira. A reduction in im will reduce ms;
hence, m̂s < 0. Thus if iLi—  UBR > ms, ^1 . may be < 0.3UBR aim 3UBR 9UBR
31For an empirical study of discount rate changes, see R. T. 
Froyen, "The Determinants of Federal Reserve Discount Rate Policy,'' 
Southern Economic Journal, 42, 2 (October 1975), pp. 193-200. Froyen 
found a positive relationship between the discount rate and other 
short-term market interest rates. He interpreted this relationship 
as resulting from Federal Reserve attempts to keep the discount rate 
in line with the costs of other ways of adjusting the short-term 
reserve positions of banks. He also found that the balance of pay­
ments deficit had a significant effect upon discount rate policy.
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9m. 3 0However, the available empirical evidence supports — 1—  >0.3 UBR
Decisions by the Federal Reserve to increase UBR, whether exogenous 
as in this chapter or endogenous as in the next chapter (perhaps 
induced by an expansionary fiscal policy) would thus result in an 
expansion in M^.
DSThe partial derivative of with respect to i is given by 
3M
— —  = -[-(.§£— )A“^*E*UBR]..DS DS3i 3i
Since ^ —  < 0 and the expression in brackets [ ] is > 0. Thus 
3iDS 
3M i  3 3— —  < 0. Federal Reserve increases in the discount rate result 
3i
in reductions in M^.
Thus far we have discussed the effects of changes in im and
Federal Reserve policy tools upon within the context of a specific
money supply model. The money supply model just developed and
analyzed is nonlinear. Since the IS-LM model used in this study is
linear, the money supply model is linearized for compatibility with
the other equations in the model. In general terms, we can write
DSthe money supply model developed above as = ms(i , i ) UBR where
OOSee the references cited in footnote 29 for this empirical
evidence.
■^See the references cited in footnote 29 for empirical 
studies that support 3M^/3iD^ < 0.
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ms( ) is the monetary policy variable multiplier. In principle, 
all of the variables listed in equation (3.19) through (3.23) 
should be included in the money supply equation. However, pre­
cedents in the money supply literature (see footnote 29) will be 
followed, and the independent variables employed in the money 
supply function will be limited to im , i*3̂ , and UBR. In linear 
form the money supply function can be written as M| = gQ + g^i™ + 
®2*t^ + B3UB\  with g.p gj > 0  and g 2  < 0. The coefficient signs 
are based upon the discussion above.
The model employed in this analysis has two different interest 
rates in the structural equations of the model. The short-term 
interest rate is determined in the money market, but the long-term 
interest rate is hypothesized to affect nominal spending. A 
simplistic term structure equation (3.13) is added to the model in 
order to tie these rates together. The long-term rate is seen as 
being influenced by the current short-term rate (a crude represen­
tation of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure) and 
also by the current level of nominal income (nominal income is taken 
as a crude proxy for the demand for loanable funds and is seen as
influencing the long-term rate directly as well as through its
. 3 4influence on the short-term rate).
•^For an explanation of the expectations and market segmen­
tation of the term structure, see for example, F. Modigliani and 
R. Sutch, "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," American Economic 
Review, 56, 2 (May 1966), pp. 178-197, and B. G. Malkiel, The Term 
Structure of Interest Rates: Theory, Empirical Evidence, and Appli­
cations (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1970).
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Equation (3.14) closes the money market equations by stipu­
lating that in every time period, the nominal demand for money 
equals the nominal supply of money.
The relationship between the rate of inflation and the rate 
of unemployment - the Phillips Curve relation - is developed in 
equation (3.15). The rate of inflation is hypothesized to be a 
function of the inverse of the rate of unemployment, the ratio of 
nominal income to potential income, and the expected rate of infla­
tion. The expected sign of the coefficient on the inverse of the 
unemployment rate, j^, is positive. The unemployment rate can be 
viewed as a proxy for demand pressure in labor markets so that as 
the unemployment rate falls, demand pressure in labor markets builds 
up, thereby tending to increase the rate of change in wages.
Assuming a constant mark-up type of pricing in product markets,
a rise in the rate of change in wages is translated into an increase
35in the rate of inflation.
The expected sign of the coefficient on the ratio of nominal 
income to nominal potential income, j 2 » is positive. The ratio of 
nominal income to nominal potential income is taken as a proxy for 
excess demand in product markets; thus an increase in this ratio tends
^^For general surveys of the inflation-unemployment relation 
see Laidler and Parkin, "Inflation," pp. 741-809; R. J. Gordon,
"Recent Developments in the Theory of Inflation and Unemployment," 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 2, 2 (April 1976), pp. 185-219; and 
H. Frisch, "Inflation Theory 1963-1975: A ’Second Generation1 Sur­
vey ," Journal of Economic Literature, 15, 4 (December 1977), pp. 
1289-1317.
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to raise the rate of inflation directly through its effect upon the
final demand for goods and services and indirectly through its effect
36upon demand pressure in labor markets.
The expected sign of the coefficient on the expected rate 
of inflation, jg, is also positive. As the expected rate of infla­
tion rises, economic units will modify their behavior in light of 
this expectation and the change in the behavior of these units will 
affect the rate of inflation. For example, as workers anticipate 
higher rates of inflation, their wage demands will reflect this 
expectation. Higher rates of wage increase coupled with constant 
mark-up pricing in product markets thus imply higher rates of 
inflation. ^
Price expectations, equation (3.16), are assumed to be formed
through an adaptive expectations mechanism. Thus the expected rate
of inflation in the current period is a weighted average of all
previous rates of inflation where the weights are greatest for the
most recent rates of inflation. In this model we assume 0 <_ 8, < 1.
This assumption insures that the expression has a finite limit and
that the expected inflation rate is more strongly influenced by the
38more recent actual rates of inflation.
36]?or further development see the references listed in 
footnote 35.
3?For further development see the references listed in 
footnote 35.
^®The references cited in footnote 35 develop the expec­
tations formation mechanism in more detail.
65
Equation (3.17) merely defines the price level in period t 
as fixed by the price level in the previous period and the current 
rate of inflation. Although the previous price level is exogenous, 
the incorporation of the current rate of inflation (which is 
endogenous) in the determination of the current price level means 
that the current price level is endogenous.
Since the ultimate concern of this study is to analyze the 
effects of fiscal policy upon changes in the money supply, the model 
described in previous paragraphs will be written in the form of 
first differences, a form which will allow direct analysis of changes 
in the money supply related to the stance of fiscal policy. In 
first difference form, the equations of the model are
Product Market
(3.11) dCt = a^(dYt - dT^) + a^ d WEt> (consumption function)
K gS
(3.2') d WE. = d(— £.) + d(_Ji) + dB,., (wealth definition)
* i* i*t t
(3.3’) dl*. = b,di^ + b9d^Y (investment function)L i t—e. t—1
+ b3dYt + V I ^ ,
(3.4') dE„ = dE , (export function)t t
(3.5') dIMt = c^dYt , (import function)
(3.6*) dGt = dGt» (government expenditure function)
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(3.7') dTt = rl,t-ldYt + Yt-ldri )t;’
(3.8’) dYt = dC,. + dl,. + dG + dE - dIM c t t t t
Money Market
(3.9') dim = t f'dM^ + f’dYt + f 'dpj?,
(3.10’) dM® = t g^di? + g2di°S + g3dUBRt,
(3.11') d i f .- hT DS- dit ,
(3.12’) dUBRt = dUBRt,
(3.13') hxdi“ + h2dYt,
(3.14') dM^ = dM=,
(net tax function)
Phillips Curve Relation
(3.15’) dP = j,d(I_) + j2d C-~=) + j3dl>>c 1 z vPOT J t
(3.16’) dF = (1-Jl) E £n"1dP , and c n=l t-n
(inverse money demand 
function)




(term structure of 
interest rates function)
(equilibrium condition)





(3.17') dPfc = (l+Pt)dPt_1 + (Pt_1)dPt. (price level definition)
IV. Government Budget Constraint
The model as specified above has one important omission - the 
federal government's budget constraint. This budget constraint 
merely stipulates that government expenditures on goods and services
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plus Interest payments on outstanding debt must be financed In the 
current period in some manner, either by tax receipts, sales of 
bonds to the private sector, an increase in the monetary base, or 
some combination of these methods of finance. As was pointed out 
by Bent Hansen, the particular form of the budget constraint appro­
priate to a model depends upon the institutional nature of the system
39the model is purported to represent. Hansen separates budget
constraints into two general types - pre-Accord (European type) and
post-Accord (United States type) budget constraints. Each type of
constraint is now briefly examined and the constraint appropriate
to the model specified above is developed.
The pre-Accord constraint has explicitly been employed in 
40several macromodels and can be written in the following manner
(3.27) <i)dG® +  dBt - Gt - Tt +
t
where
39Hansen, "On the Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy,"
p. 549.
40See for example, A Blinder and R. Solow, "Does Fiscal Policy 
Matter?," Journal of Public Economics, 2, 4 (November 1973), pp. 319- 
37; A. Blinder and R. Solow, "Analytical Foundations of Fiscal Policy," 
in A. Blinder and others, The Economics of Public Finance (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 3-115; C. Christ, "A
Short-Run Aggregate Demand Model of the Interdependence and Effects 
of Monetary and Fiscal Policies with Keynesian and Classical Interest 
Elasticities," American Economic Review, 57, 2 (May 1967), pp. 434-43; 
and C.F.Christ, "A Simple Macroeconomic Model with A Government Budget 
Restraint," Journal of Political Economy, 76, 1 (January/February 
1968), pp. 53-67.
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1 S(— r)dG = the change in the nominal value of government bonds held by ±i
the public in period t resulting from Treasury and Federal
41Reserve actions, evaluated at the current market price, 
dBt = the change in the nominal monetary base in period t,
Gt = nominal government purchases of goods and services in
period t,
Tt = nominal net tax receipts in period t, to include subtraction
of interest payments on securities issued to the public in
period t from net taxes,
and
Dt_^ = the nominal interest payments on outstanding government
securities in the hands of the public at the end of period
This constraint specifies that the deficit (Gt - Tt) plus interest 
payments on outstanding debt from the previous period must be
41Note that this differs from the change in the market value 
of outstanding bonds which is given by d(Gs/i^)t.
42This formulation of the pre-Accord constraint implicity 
assumes that Treasury balances are constant during this period. As 
was noted in a previous section of this chapter (Direct Links Between 
Fiscal Policy and the Money Supply), changes in Treasury balances 
have a trivial effect upon reserves and the monetary base (see pp. 33-35). 
For this reason, changes in Treasury balances will not be incorporated 
into this constraint. The particular form of the constraint also 
abstracts from foreign transactions and their effects upon the mone­
tary base. Changes in foreign balances at the Federal Reserve are 
typically thought of as a transaction that the Federal Reserve off­
sets (at least partly) in its open-market operations. (See Lombra 
and Torto, "Federal Reserve," pp. 47-55.) For this reason, foreign 
transactions are excluded from the budget constraint.
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financed by issuance of new securities and/or an increase in the 
monetary base.
Although this constraint has been utilized in some macro­
models of the United States economy, the appropriateness of this 
constraint for the United States economy given the current institu­
tional division between fiscal and monetary policymaking authorities 
is questionable. A budget constraint of the pre-Accord type implies 
an institutional structure where fiscal and monetary policymaking 
are centered in one authority (as is found in some European countries) 
or a structure with separate policy authorities where one authority 
is under the thumb of the other (the United States in the pre-Treasury 
Federal Reserve Accord period). The coordination of monetary and 
fiscal policy and hence the division of the total required financing 
between security issues to the public and changes in the monetary 
base is facilitated by either of these institutional settings.
However, the institutional nature of macro policymaking in 
the United States changed after the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord 
of 1951. As was noted in an earlier section of this chapter, the 
Accord has been interpreted as freeing the Federal Reserve to con­
duct monetary policy ao as to achieve the goals specified in the
43Employment Act of 1946. An important implication of the Accord is 
that any change in the monetary base is ultimately at the discretion
43„See pp. 38-39 of this chapter.
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of the Federal Reserve. The implied single authority coordination of 
both fiscal and monetary policy found in the pre-Accord constraint is 
inappropriate in a period of time in which the authority to conduct 
monetary and fiscal policy is vested in independent decision making 
units. It would thus seem that a constraint that recognizes the 
institutional realities of the post-Accord period would be appro­
priate for a macro-model of the United States after 1951. Because 
of this institutional change, Hansen’s post-Accord constraint is 
employed in the remainder of the analysis in this paper.
The post-Accord budget constraint can be written as
(3.28) 4 )dGt’F - 5t - Tt + Dt-1
t
where 
1 S F(— r)dG * = the nominal value of securities issued in period t by the
fiscal authority, evaluated at the current market price,
and the other elements in the constraint are as previously defined.
This constraint specifies that a change in the deficit plus the
interest payments on outstanding debt at the end of the previous
period is financed entirely by an issue of new securities to the 
44public. As noted earlier, we may observe a concurrent increase in 
the monetary base, but presumably, this increase in the monetary base 
is undertaken at the discretion of the Federal Reserve and is not an
44The assumptions made in footnote 41 also apply to this 
budget constraint.
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automatic response to the financing requirements of the fiscal
authority.
Since the post-Accord constraint differs from the pre-Accord
constraint by the elimination of the automatic response of the mone­
tary authority, a constraint for the monetary authority must be added 
to a model which adopts a post-Accord constraint for the fiscal 
authority. The constraint for the monetary authority can be derived 
from the sources and uses of the monetary base statement for the 
Federal Reserve. The sources side of this statement can be summarized
where
Bt = nominal monetary base,
(-L)gS>M




A t = discounts and advances, and
Xt = summary variable which includes positive values for float
the gold stock, SDRs, and Treasury currency outstanding
and negative values for Treasury deposits at the Federal
Reserve, foreign deposits at the Federal Reserve, Treasury
cash holdings, and other liabilities and capital accounts.
From the sources side, the change in B can be written as
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The uses side of the statement can be written as 
Bfc « UBRt + BRt + Ct
where
BRt « borrowed reserves (s Afc) and all other variables are as pre­
viously defined.
From the uses side the change in B is given by
(3.29) dBt = dUBRt + dCt + dAt.
Utilizing the necessary equality between a change in the 
sources and the uses of the monetary base, we can write
(~T)dGt*M + ^ t  + dXt " dUBRt + dCt +
At
Rearranging, we obtain
(3.30) (~T)dGB »M » dUBR + d a  - dX„.
.X, t t t t
t
This equation can thus be interpreted as the constraint for the 
monetary authority.
The first difference form of the model can be completed by 
the addition of the following equations
(3.28) (-±r)dG=-F - Gt - Tt + D ^ ,
(3.29) dBt = dUBRt + dCt + dAt,
1 swhere (— r)dG = the change in the nominal value of government securi 
itties evaluated at current market prices in the hands of the public 
and all other variables are as previously defined.
Equation (3.28) is the budget constraint of the fiscal 
authority, and equation (3.30) is the budget constraint of the 
Federal Reserve. Equation (3.29) is merely a definition derived 
from the sources and uses statement for the monetary base. Equation
(3.31) specifies that the change in the nominal value of government 
seucrities in the hands of the public evaluated at current market 
prices is the difference between the nominal value of the change 
in securities issued by the fiscal authority and the change in the 
nominal value of government securities held by the Federal Reserve, 
again evaluated at current market prices.
The budget constraints just developed are linked to the rest 
of the model through the wealth equation. The wealth equation in 
first difference form was written as
GS
(3.2’) dWEt = d£|) + d(-|) + dBt.
it it
Expanding the differential of this equation, we obtain
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K
d«Et - (i)dKt - (-£>aij + (i)dGS - + dBt.
h  *t *t *t
Substituting the relationships specified in equations (3.28), (3.29),
(3.30) and (3.31) into equation (3.2’) we obtain
K GS
dHEt - (i)dKt - ( - £ ) « *  - ( - ^ d i *  + [Gc - Tt + - dUBR - dC£
t t t
+ dX£] + [dUBRt + dCt + dAt].
Rearranging this equation, we obtain a final expression for the change 
in net wealth which is substituted for equation (3.2') in the model
(3.2") dWEt - Gt - Tt + D t _ 1  + dXt + dAt + (-p-)dKt
K , GS . .. t “ 1
-  E<Tir> + <7 5 ^  K -
1 t-i it-i
45In order to preserve the linearity of the model, the terms 
(~^)dKt and [(Kt/i^) + (G^/i^)]di^ will be approximated by (— ^— )
it 1t-i
1 — — 9 2 Q P 2 P
(— j— )dKfc and [ (Kt_-j_/it_i) + ^ t - l ^ t - l ^ ^ t ’ aPProx:I-mat::i-on does
1 t-l
not alter the basic conclusions of the model and is merely a discrete
approximation to a continuous process. Futhermore, the expressions
G. i + dG. and T. . + r. . . dYfc + Y. .dr. . will be substituted for _t-l t t- 1  l,t-l t t- 1  l,t
Gt and Tt> respectively, in equation (3.2") since the policy variables
of interest are dG„ and Y„ .dr.t t- 1  l,t
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V. Solution of the Complete Model
The IS-LM model can now be solved to obtain reduced form 
equations for dYfc and di™. The reduced form equation for di® is 
employed in the next section to obtain a reduced form equation for 
the money supply.
Combining and rearranging equations (3.1'), (3.2"), (3.3'), 
(3.4'), (3.51), (3.61), (3.7’), (3.8'), and (3.13'), we obtain the 
following IS equation
<3'32) dYt " ̂  {(l+*2>d5t - (al + a2 > V l drl,t + a2'«t-l - Tt-1
K
+ »t- i + “ t + “ t + ^ > dEt] - a2 hi” 7 i r >
1 t-l t- 1
GS




A0 " (1 "al+alrl,t-l+a 2 rl,t-l+a2h2 [ ]“b3+cl} *
1 t-l 1 t-l
Combining and rearranging equations (3.9"), (3.10'), (3.11'), 
(3.12'), and (3.141), we obtain the following LM equation
O.33) di™ = i{f{g2dlf - fJgjdOTR,. + qdvt + f'dP*},
where
A 1  ■ ( 1  + fjgj)-
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Solving equations (3.32) and (3.33) simultaneously, we obtain
mthe following reduced form equations for dYfc and dit
0.34) <Ht = i { A 3 dGt - A ^ d r ^  + A , [ G ^ - T ^ + D ^ + d X ^
+ (-f-)dK,] - A6dit*_2 + A?dYt_1 + A g d l ^  + A9dEt 
1 t“l
- A10dI“  + Alld® \  " A12®t>
and
(3.35) dlj = ̂ A 1 3 dGt - Ali,Yt.1 dr1>t + A1S [ G ^ - T ^ ^ d d A , .
+ ( T ^ ) d K t) - A16diA.2 + A17dYt.1 + A18dlt.1 + A19dlt 
1 t-l
+ A20dIf  - A21d® t  + A22«t}"
where
K GS
A2 " {1“al+alrl,t-l+a2rl,t-l+a2h2[(ri2“)+(Tl2”^ ~ b3+Cl)
1 t-l t- 1
K
±t-l 1 t-l
A 3  = (l+a2 )(l+f{gl), 
A4 = (ai+a 2 ^ 1 +f{Si) »
A5 = a2^1 +fi8 l^»
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A 6  " bi^1 +fi8 i^» 
A 7  ■ b 2 (l+f;*g1), 
A 8  " b 4 (l+f»8l), 
Ag = (l+f{8l),
“t-
A 1 0  “ a2 hl^' £ 2  
it-
K


































f 2  *
A 0  * 
A 0 (fj!g3), and
A22 "
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VI. Derivation of the Reduced Form Money Supply Equation and Analysis 
of the Effects of Fiscal Policy Upon the Money Supply
The results obtained in the preceding section can be combined
with the money supply equation to obtain a reduced form equation for
the money supply. Combining and rearranging equations (3.10') and
(3.35), we obtain the following reduced form money supply equation
(3.36) dM* . g1 C ^ ) d G t - + D t _ 1
+ dXt +  dAt + (-f-)dKt) - +  8 1 ( ^ Z)dYt _ 1
■̂t-l 1
+ t«3 - +
All variables and coefficients are as previously defined.
The effects of fiscal policy upon changes in the money supply 
can now be determined by examining the partial derivatives of dM^ 
with respect to an exogenous change in government expenditures 
(dG ) and an exogenous change in tax receipts (Y .dr ). Theset u"*J. 1 ) U
partial derivatives are given by
3dM8
(3.37) 3 dGfc " 81 A13^A2 and
3dM?
(3.38) 3Y dr“ " 8 1  A14/A2 *t- 1  1 ,t
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To determine the signs of these drivatives we need to
examine the elements in each expression. Let us first examine the
term A 2  = { (l-ai+a1 r 1 }t_1 +a 2 r1 }t_1 -a2 h2 [ ]-b3+Cl) (1 + f ^ )
±t-l t- 1
K GS+ q c a h [<-i=i)+c_£ji)m.
it-i 1 t-i
Based upon the previous discussion of the individual equations of the 
model, the elements of A 2  are assumed to have the following signs 
and magnitudes
0  < a^ < 1 , 0 < a 2 < 1 , 0  < r^ < 1 , h 2 > 0 , b 3  > 0 , c-̂  > 0 ,
K q S
(—|zl.) > 0, (— >0, f^ > 0, g^ > 0, f^ > 0, and h^ > 0. The
t- 1  t- 1
term (l-a1 +a 1 rljt._1 +a 2 rljt_1 -a2 h 2 [(-^l)+(^zi.)]-b3 +c1) Is > 0  if
t- 1  t- 1
(1 +alrX,t-l+a 2 rl,t-l+cl) > (al+a 2 h 2 t(% i)+(% i)]+b3 )- theoretical
1 t-l ±t-l
and empirical evidence tends to support the direction of this
i n e q u a l i t y h e n c e , we will assume that the term (1 -a^+a^r^
R gS
+ a2rl t-l"a2 ^ 2 ^ ‘ t"^)3"bo+c ) > 0. Since fI and are > 0,* j £ 2  j £ 2  i
t- 1  t- 1
See for example, Branson, Macroeconomic Theory and Policy, 
pp. 169-226, 267-318, and E. Kuh and R. L. Schmalensee, An Intro­
duction to Applied Macroeconomics (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub­
lishing Co., 1973), pp. 31-101, 175-83.
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the term (l+f£g^) is also > 0. The product of this term and the
Kpreviously discussed term is thus > 0 . Since f ' (a„h- [ (—JiziL)+(_£“L) ])
2  2  1  M  M
t- 1  t“l
> 0  we can conclude that A£ > 0 . ^
The sign of can now be determined. Since A,, =
3dGt
(l+agjfg and since a 2 > and A 2  are all positive, we see
that = g > 0. This result can be explained in the' following
3dGt A2
manner: An increase in dGt, ceteris paribus, directly stimulates
aggregate demand and necessitates issuance of more bonds by the 
fiscal authority. The bond financing increases net wealth and 
further stimulates aggregate demand. The mode of financing and 
the increase in aggeegate demand put upward pressure upon the 
interest rate. The interest rate increase leads to adjustments 
in the non-bank public's holdings of currency, demand and time 
deposits and in commercial banks holdings of excess reserves and 
borrowings from the Federal Reserve. As a result of these adjust­
ments, the policy variable multiplier rises and, with a given 
level of the policy variable, the money supply rises. The rise in 
interest rates also tends to mitigate or even to offset the increase 
in net wealth and thus tends to reduce the initial increase in 
aggregate demand and hence interest rates. Whether this effect
/ 7We should note that this conclusion is based upon theo­
retical and empirical studies such as those cited in footnote 46.
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offsets the stimulatory effect of the initial change in G and
bonds outstanding is an empirical question; however, evidence
from macroeconometric models of the United States economy suggests
that the initial stimulatory effect of dG > 0 is not offset by the
interest rate effect upon net wealth.^®
3dM§Thus  E = g-A-o/A- represents the change in the money
3dGt
supply induced by private sector response to higher interest rates 
brought about by the increase in income and net wealth attributable 
to the increase in government purchases of goods and services. The 
meaning of the term ^2 or (1 +^ 2 ) ̂ 2 ^ ^ 2  can **e explained in the 
following manner: (1 +a 2 ) M 2  represents the change in income asso­
ciated with a one unit change in government expenditures and the 
term Cl+a2^2^2 rePresents change in the short-term market 
interest rate as a result of the change in income. Since g^ is the 
coefficient on di™ in the money supply equation, the entire expres­
sion represents the change in the money supply as a result of the 
change in government expenditures.
The expansionary effect of the increase in government expen­
ditures upon the money supply can also be explained graphically in 
the context of the money market. The increase in government
^®See for example, G. V. L. Narasimham, "Policy Multipliers 
in a Quarterly Econometric Model of the U.S. Economy," Southern 
Economic Journal, 43, 4 (April 1977), pp. 1486-1504; and N. N. 
Choudhry, "Integration of Fiscal and Monetary Sectors in Econo­
metric Models: A Survey of Theoretical Issues and Empirical 
Findings," International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 23, 2 (July 
1976), pp. 395-440.
expenditure, as noted before, leads to an increase in income.
The rise in income stimulates the demand for money. This is illu­
strated in Figure I by the shift in the money demand curve from 
M 0  t 0  Ml* Private sector response to the initial disequilibrium 
in the money market leads to a movement along the curve until 
equilibrium is restored at a higher interest rate (i^) and an 
increased money supply (M^).
Figure I
Fiscal Policy Effects Upon the Money Supply 
The sign of 3dM^/3Y dr. will now be analyzed. Sincet—1 X j t
g^ > 0 , A ^  = (a^+agjf^ > 0 , and A 2  > 0 , we are led to the con­
clusion that 3dM?/3Y ,dr < 0. This result can be explained in c l,t
the following manner: An increase in Yt_^dr^ ^ ceteris paribus,
reduces disposable income and hence aggregate demand. This change 
also reduces the size of the deficit to be financed or perhaps 
generates a surplus. The reduction in aggregate demand, and the
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potential debt retirement, puts downward pressure upon interest 
rates. The fall in interest rates induces adjustments by banks 
and the non-bank public that reduce the policy variable multiplier 
and hence the money supply. The fall in interest rates tends to 
raise net wealth and thus mitigates the decline in aggregate 
demand. However, evidence from econometric models again suggests
that the effect upon income and interest rates is not reversed by\
this wealth effect.^
3MtWe can interpret ----- =---- = -gi A,, /Ao as the change in
14 2
the money supply induced by private sector response to lower
interest rates brought about by the reduction in income induced
(a,+a9)by the contractionary tax changes. The term — ±— =—  represents
a 2
the change in income induced by a unit change in taxes and 
(an+a 9 )f*
— ±— =— £. represents the change in interest rates as a result of 
A2
the change in money demand stemming from the change in income. In 
Figure I, this conclusion is illustrated by the shift in money demand 
from to as income falls and the movement down the money supply 
curve to i™ and M 2 .
49see the references cited in footnote 48.
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VII. Conclusion
We thus conclude that in the context of the macroeconomic 
model developed in this chapter, and given widely held perceptions 
about the signs and magnitudes of the structural coefficients in 
the model, a change in government expenditures leads to a change 
in the money supply in the same direction and a change in the
exogenous component of tax receipts leads to a change in the money
\
supply in the opposite direction. The changes in the money supply 
examined in this chapter stem solely from private sector response 
to changes in income and interest rates resulting from a change in 
fiscal policy. The Federal Reserve and its policy tools were 
assumed to be exogenous,that is, the Federal Reserve was presumed 
not to respond systematically to the movements in such variables 
as income and interest rates that evoked private sector response. 
The next chapter will examine the effects of fiscal policy upon 
changes in the money supply when Federal Reserve actions are 
endogenous to the model. The conclusions about the effects of 
fiscal policy upon the money supply when Federal Reserve behavior 
is endogenous are then contrasted with the money supply effects 
examined in this chapter.
CHAPTER IV
MONETARY EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY WHEN 
FEDERAL RESERVE BEHAVIOR IS ENDOGENOUS
I. Introduction
The previous chapter examined the fiscal policy effects 
upon the money supply under the presumption that monetary policy 
was exogenous. Federal Reserve policymakers were assumed not to 
systematically react to the current movement of economic variables 
and to the current stance of fiscal policy; thus, any change in 
the money supply related to fiscal policy resulted from portfolio 
and spending adjustments by commercial banks and the non-bank 
public. However, if Federal Reserve policymakers respond to current 
movements in macroeconomic variables, then treatment of monetary 
policy as exogenous is inappropriate, and monetary policy should 
be considered endogenous.
The appropriateness of treating the Federal Reserve as 
endogenous is supported by policy statements issued by Federal 
Reserve officials and by the empirical studies cited in Chapter II. ̂
For example, the FOMC policy directive to the System Open 
Market Account manager contains references to the current and expec­
ted future movements of macroeconomic variables and to the reserve, 
monetary aggregate, and money market conditions required to move the 
macroeconomic variables toward the positions desired by the Federal 
Reserve. The November 15, 1977 domestic policy directive contains 
the following evidence of Federal Reserve concern with macroeconomic 
variables: M. . . in light of the foregoing developments, it is
the policy of the Federal Open Market Committee to foster bank
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As was mentioned in previous chapters, monetary policy will be 
made endogenous in this study by postulating that the monetary 
authorities act as if they were minimizing a loss function which 
contains as arguments the weighted squared differences between 
actual and desired states of macroeconomic variables of expressed 
concern to Federal Reserve policymakers subject to the policy­
makers’ perception of the structure of the economy. The remainder 
of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the particular form 
of the Federal Reserve loss function and to the derivation of a 
policy reaction function for the Federal Reserve. This reaction 
function relates the Federal Reserve policy variable to exogenous 
and lagged endogenous variables from the macroeconomic model
reserve and other financial conditions that will encourage con­
tinued economic expansion and help resist inflationary pressures, 
while contributing to a sustainable pattern of international 
transaction . . . ." This statement is taken from "Record of 
Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee," Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, 64 (January 1978), p. 25. Similar statements 
can be found in other issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin, or 
in any recent issue of the Annual Report of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System.
For examples of empirical studies supporting the concept 
of an endogenous monetary policy, see J. H. Wood," A Model of 
Federal Reserve Behavior," in G. Horwich, ed., Monetary Process 
and Policy (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1967), pp. 135-66; 
A. F. Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals in the Postwar Period: A
Study in Revealed Preference," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 1 
(February 1973), pp. 25-43; R.T. Froyen, "A Test of the Endogeniety of 
Monetary Policy." Journal of Econometrics, 2, 2(July 1974), pp. 175-88;
T. Havrilesky, "A Test of Monetary Policy Action," Journal of Poli- 
tical Economy, 75, 3 (June 1967), pp. 299-304; T. Havilesky, R. M. 
Sapp, and R. L. Schweitzer, "Tests of the Federal Reserve's Reaction 
to the State of the Economy 1964-74," Social Science Quarterly 55, 4 
(March 1975), pp. 835-52; and M. W. Keran and C. T. Babb, "An Expla­
nation of Federal Reserve Actions (1933-68)," Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis Review, 51, 7(July 1969), pp. 7-20.
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formulated in the previous chapter and to desired values for the 
arguments in the loss function. The policy reaction function is 
then incorporated into the macroeconomic model and a reduced form 
equation for the money supply is derived. The reduced form money 
supply equation is then employed in the analysis of the effects of 
fiscal policy upon the money supply when monetary policy is 
endogenous.
II. The Federal Reserve Loss Function
The form of the loss function employed in this study is a
static quadratic function without interaction terms. The loss
function contains as arguments the weighted squared current period
deviations of actual from desired values for real GNP, the rate of
inflation, the balance of trade, and the short-term interest rate.
The arguments included in the loss function are drawn from policy
statements by Federal Reserve officials and are similar to the
2arguments in previous reaction function studies. The quadratic
loss function is employed here as in approximation to the "true"
loss function of the Federal Reserve policymakers, although there
are certain well known problems encountered with this particular
3form of the loss function. Despite these problems, the quadratic
OASee the references cited in footnote 1  of this chapter.
^One problem with a quadratic loss function noted by Wood, 
"A Model of Federal Reserve Behavior," p. 139 is the implicit 
assumption that the same level of loss is associated with an actual 
value of an argument that exceeds a desired value by a certain
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function is used in this study because of its widespread usage 
in estimating policy reaction functions, because this type of loss 
function produces linear policy reaction functions, and because 
the relative weights in the loss function can be readily determined.
The following quadratic loss function is postulated as 
representative of the Federal Reserve's preferences
(4.1) it = w^dC^t) - dy* ) 2  + w 2 (dPt - dP* ) 2  + w 3 (dBTt - dBT* ) 2  
Pt t
+ w 4 (di™ - di™*)2,
where
= level of loss in period t,
Yfc = nominal output in period t,
Pt = price level in period t,
d(—£) = actual change in real output from t- 1  to t,
Pt
dy* = desired change in real output from t- 1  to t,
dPt = actual change in rate of inflation from t- 1  to t,
dP* = desired change in rate of inflation from t-1 to t,
amount as is associated with the actual value below the desired 
value by the same amount.
Other problems with the quadratic approach have been 
enumerated by Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals," p . 26, and 
include the following observations: (1 ) the desired values of
the arguments in the disutility function must be attainable, and
(2 ) empirical estimates of the weights are sensitive to the 
deviations of actual from desired values.
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dBTt = actual change in balance of trade from t- 1  to t,
dBT* = desired change in balance of trade from t-1 to t,
di™ = actual change in short-term interest rate from t- 1  to t, and
di™* = desired change in short-term interest rate from t- 1  to t.
are measures of the traditionally stated goals of monetary and fiscal 
policy. The balance of trade is utilized here as a proxy for 
Federal Reserve concern with the balance-of-payments since, unlike 
the balance of trade, the balance of payments is not endogenous to 
the model developed earlier. The term (di™ - di™*)^ is included 
to capture Federal Reserve concern for orderly conditions in finan­
cial markets (taken here as the absence of large changes in market 
interest rates) and for the avoidance of the disruptive effects of 
disintermediation felt in some sectors of the economy, especially 
the housing sector.
It should be noted that all of the arguments in the loss 
function are in the form of current period changes. This formula­
tion of the loss function thus implies that the Federal Reserve's 
time horizon is one period long. Since the basic period of interest 
in this study is a quarter and since the policy making process at 
the Federal Reserve begins with the development of four-quarter 
forecasts for output, inflation, unemployment, and other economic
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variables by the s t a f f t h e  focus upon current period deviations 
in this chapter may be questioned. For example, if the Federal 
Reserve had a four-quarter horizon the loss function might be 
formulated in the following manner
+ S w _ . (dBT - dBT* J 2  + w, (di™ - di"1*)2. i= 0  3x t+i t+i 4 t t
In this formulation the Federal Reserve is concerned with current 
period deviations and with forecasted deviations for the next three 
quarters for real output, the inflation rate, and the balance of 
trade. Current period deviations are considered sufficient only 
for financial market stability.*’
While the employment of a four-quarter loss function appears 
to be in line with stated policy procedures, the significance of 
utilizing this function depends upon the relative weights assigned 
by the Federal Reserve to future peiod deviations. If the future
^For a description of the policy making process at the 
Federal Reserve, see R. L. Lombra and R. G. Torto, "The Strategy 
of Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Monthly 
Review. September/October 1975, pp. 3-14; and J. L. Pierce, 
"Quantitative Analysis for Decisions at the Federal Reserve,"
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 3, 1 (1974), pp. 11-19.
-*A formulation of this type is consistent with the policy­
making process described in the references in footnote 4 of this 
chapter.
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period weights are significant relative to the current period
weights, then the multi-period loss function is appropriate.
However, if the future period weights are insignificant relative
to the current period weights, then the multi-period loss function
is inappropriate. Some evidence on the relative significance of
the weights in a multi-period function has been provided by 
£
Friedlaender. Friedlaender found that in a two-quarter framework 
the second quarter weights were insignificant relative to the 
current quarter weights. These results are suggestive that a one- 
period disutility function is adequate to describe the preferences 
of the Federal Reserve.
Furthermore, even though the Federal Reserve employs fore­
casts of economic activity for the next four to six quarters in its
policy making process, a reading of FOMC directives leaves one 
uncertain about how far into the future the Federal Reserve's 
concern extends. For example, in a discussion of the FOMC directive, 
Axilrod asserts:
Generally, only the statement about over-all economic 
activity had a future cast to it. But the time horizon 
for this future was often rather indefinite. Sometimes
the wording has been such that the reader would think
it referred to no more than a quarter ahead, or to the 
quarter in process. An example of such wording would 
be "economic activity appears to be slowing." On the
^Friedlaender, "Macro Policy Goals," p. 27.
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other hand, at times statements simply noted that 
economic activity is projected to slow. In such _
cases the time horizon appears more indefinite, (p. 3)
It is thus often difficult to determine the exact length of 
the Federal Reserve's time horizon for policymaking. Furthermore, 
based upon the results obtained by Friedlaender, the widespread 
usage of the one-period approach in the reaction-function litera­
ture, and the difficulty of determining the exact length of the 
appropriate time horizon, a one-period function will be employed 
in this study as representative of the Federal Reserve's 
preferences
III. The Federal Reserve Policy Reaction Function
The derivation of the policy reaction function can be 
facilitated by employing matrix algebra. The loss function can 
be written in matrix form as
A = (Yt-Y£)'W(Yt-Y*)
where
Y = nxl vector of actual values of the arguments in the loss 
function and n equals the number of arguments,
7 S. H. Axilrod, "The FOMC Directive As Structured in the 
Late 1960's: Theory and Appraisal," in Open Market Policies and
Operating Procedures - Staff Studies (Washington, D.C.: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 1971), pp. 1-36.
QStatistical considerations may also influence the choice of 
the time horizon if the reaction function is to be empirically esti­
mated. A multi-period horizon may, by reducing the available 
degrees of freedom, increase the degree of multicollinearity to 
such an extent that the estimated coefficients are unreliable.
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Y* = nxl vector of desired values of the arguments in the loss 
function, and
9W = nxn diagonal matrix of positive weights in the loss function.
In the approach taken in this study, the Federal Reserve is 
assumed to minimize a subject to its perception of the structure of 
the U.S. economy. In matrix form the structure of the economy can 
be written as
Yt = JRt + HZt where
Rt = lxl vector of the Federal Reserve policy variable,
J = nxl vector of coefficients on the policy variable,
= mxl vector of exogenous and lagged endogenous variables, and
H = nxm matrix of coefficients on the variables in Zt
9 For more detailed definitions of these matrices and the 
matrices defined in the next paragraph, see Appendix One: Matrix
Derivation of the Federal Reserve Policy Reaction Function.
■^This formulation of the Federal Reserve's constraint implies 
that the policymaker knows the structure of the economy with cer­
tainty. In actuality the structure is not known with certainty. 
However, Theil's certainty equivalence theorem states that as long 
as the policymaker optimizes with respect to the expected values of 
the stochastic variables (the elements of Yfc), the solution is the 
same as if all uncertainty had been disregarded, as has been done 
here. For a proof of this see H. Theil, Economic Forecasts and 
Policy, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1961), 
pp. 414-7.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the policymaker acts as if 
the multipliers between the policy variable and the elements of Yt 
are known with certainty. For a discussion of this assumption, see 
W. Brainard, "Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy," American 
Economic Review, 57, 2 (May 1967), pp. 411-25.
The minimization problem can be solved by substituting 
Yfc = JRt + HZ£ into the loss function, expanding the resulting 
expression, taking the partial derivative of this expression 
with respect to Rt, and then solving the resulting first-order 
condition for R... Substituting JR.. + HZ into I = (Y -Y*) *W(Y -Y*),L t L C U t
we obtain
Expanding this expression we obtain
A = (JR..) fW(JR )+2(JR ) 'W(HZ )-2(JR. ) 'WY*+(HZ ) 'W(HZ )-2(HZ ) 'WY*L t t L L u
+ y *'w y *.
Taking the partial derivative of 5. with respect to Rt and setting 
it equal to zero, we obtain
a = (JR.. + HZ. - Y*)’W(JR. + HZ.. - Y*)^ t t t t t
u
3R.t
= 2J’WJRt + 2J'WHZt - 2J'WY* = 0 or
M.
3Rt
= J ’WJR. + J'WHZ. - J'WY* = 0 t t
Solving this equation for Rt, we obtain
The equation Rfc = [J'WJ]“ V w Y *  - [J'WJ] ” 1  J'WHZt relates 
the Federal Reserve's policy tool to desired values of the arguments 
in the loss function and to exogenous and lagged endogenous 
variables from the macro model. This equation can thus be inter­
preted as the Federal Reserve's policy reaction function. After 
performing the necessary matrix manipulations, the policy reaction 
function can be rewritten in the following form
(4.3) d(IBRt = -V 0  - V 1 dGt + V 2 Yt.1 drlit - T j t G ^  -
+ dXt +  dAt + C-f-)dKt] + V4 di* . 2  - V 5 dV t _ 1  
1 t~l
" V 6 dlt- 1  - V7dlt + V 8 dIf  + V Bt + V 1 0 d(^ >
where












A 1 1 A1 2 S l"fw4A21A2 2 -wlA 2 AllA 2  6
A2A11S3 
S 2  ’
A2A11A4 
S2 ’
w 1A2A11(p7 T +A25)t- 1
V








S 2  ’
c / 1 . . N2 , . 2 / 1 x 2 , 2
1 " 1(“ 25 W2̂  2 yPOT W3C1
t- 1  Yt- 1
S2 “ A11S1 + w 4A21*
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53 " WljlA24(P T 7 fA25) + W2^1^2^YPOT^ ’
t"A t- 1
Y Y
54 " wlA24(Pr7+A25)(7 0 T ) + W2̂  ^.POT^ ’
t “ 1  Yt- 1  Yt- 1
A 2 3  = ( ^ i ) a + p t)dPt.i,
Pt- 1
Yt- 1
A24 - (d H 1)pt-r
pt-l
Yt- 1
A25 “ ( 2 *Pt-lJ2»
Pt- 1
A26 = A24j3’
and all other terms are as previously defined.
Although the change in the monetary policy instrument is a 
linear function of exogenous and lagged endogenous variables and 
of the desired values of the arguments in the loss function, the 
coefficients of the independent variables are complex mixtures 
of structural parameters and weights in the policymakers' loss 
function. A shift in either the structural parameters or in the 
relative weights in the loss function will lead to a change in the 
implied magnitude or, perhaps, in the sign of the coefficients in 
the policy reaction function. For example, de-emphasis upon finan­
cial market stability and increased emphasis upon the deviation of 
the actual change in real output from the desired change in real 
output or upon the deviation of the actual inflation rate from the
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desired rate will change the size and perhaps the sign of the 
coefficients on dGt and Y£_^dr^  ̂and will thereby change the 
implied response of the monetary policymakers to a change in 
government expenditures or tax receipts. The responsiveness of 
the money supply to a change in these variables will also be 
altered as a result of a shift in preferences by monetary 
policymakers.
IV. Derivation of the Reduced Form Money Supply Equation and
Analysis of the Effects of Fiscal Policy Upon the Money Supply
The policy reaction function can now be combined with the 
structural model to derive a reduced form equation for the money 
supply. Substituting equation (4,3) and (3,35) (the reduced form equa­
tion of di^) into equation (3.10') (the money supply equation), we 
obtain the following reduced form money supply equation
dMt - H0 +  HidEt - H 2 Yt-idr1,t + V V r t A i W i - K 1
it-l
- V dt-2 + H5dV l  + H6dIt-l + H7dSt + H8ddf  + V Bt
- H10d^ >  + HlldYt°T + »12d̂  + »13«? + HU dBT? ' H15di?*
where
Ho = - FV
A 1 3
H 1  = B l A f - rV
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H 2  " gl i f  - * V
H3 ’ %  j f  - ^3 -
»5 " *1 i f  - * V
He ■ h  i f  ~ FV
H7 8 1  A 2  " ^ 7 ’
H 8  gl A2° ' rV6 >
H9 - 8l l f  ’ CT9-
H 1 0  ™ 1 0 >
H 1 1  = -FV1 1 >
H 1 2  " ^ 1 2 *





F = ( 8 3 - g l ^ ) .
and the V's and the g's are as previously defined.
S -The partial derivatives of dMt with respect to dGt and
Y dr.. can now be determined. These partial derivatives aret" J, X ̂ t
given by
= R1 A13 - (g3  - gx k 21)Vlt 
3dGt A2 A2
and
9dM? a 1 4  a 2 1
aY dr " [Sl A 2  ~ ( S 3  ~ 6 1  A 2  )V2l‘ ̂ t- 1  l,t 2  2
The signs of these derivatives depend in a complex way upon the 
structural parameters of the model and the relative weights on the 
arguments in the policymakers' loss function; evaluation of the 
signs requires as a starting point some assumptions about the 
relative weights in the loss function.
Let us evaluate 3dM^/3dGt first. This partial derivative
can be rewritten as
A21 w j. „ A13
-S3V1 + gl X f  V1 + gl A2
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As a starting point in the evaluation of the sign of this derivative, 
the sign of (-V ), the coefficient on dGt in the policy reaction 
function, will be analyzed. (-V^) can be written as
rA 1 1 A 3 S1 -w4 A2 1 A 1 3 i 
“I 0 J •
s 2
2  2S2 , in expanded form, equals A^S^+w^A^. is equal to
Y
wl[p— + (“ 2 P̂t-1^2^2 + W2^2^POT^2 + W3C1̂ * Since tp ~  +
t- 1  t- 1  t _ 1
Y
(-|zi)Pt_ 1 j2]2, j 2 (-JL_)2, and c2  are > 0  and since w ^  w2> and w 3  
Pt- 1  Yt- 1
2 2are > 0, S, is > 0. Since A and A0, are > 0 and S. and w# are > 0, 
1  1 1  2 1  1  H ’
S3  > 0. Thus since S2  is > 0, for (-V^) to be > 0 (thereby implying 
that the Federal Reserve increases any change in the level of its 
policy instrument in response to an increase in government expen­
diture) the term “ [A^jA-jS^ - w 4 ^ 2 l^i3  ̂ must be > 0. Stated 
alternatively, [w4A2i^i3 “ ^ H ^ 3 S1^ must be > 0. For this inequality
At 1 Aoto hold, W/A^A., must be > A.-A-S. or w, > - S..* 21 13 11 3 1  4 A n A l 3  1
Thus if the weight assigned by the Federal Reserve to
financial market stability exceeds the sum of the weights on all
other arguments in the loss function where this sum is pre-
A-i 1 Ao
multiplied by the ratios (7 — ) (7 — ), (-V,) will be > 0. Since g~
"21 13
(the coefficient on dUBRt in the money supply function - see 
equation (3.10') is > 0, if (-V^) is > 0, then the money supply
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change will be positive as a result of dGt > 0. The term 
is the ratio of the coefficient on dUBRt in the reduced form equation 
for dYfc (equation (3.34)) and the coefficient on dUBRt in the reduced 
form equation for di™ (equation (3.35)), respectively. The term 
(Ag/A^g) is the ratio of the coefficient on dGt in the reduced 
form equation for dYfc and the coefficient on dGt in the reduced 
form equation for di™, respectively. The extent to which w^ must 
exceed depends upon the values of these ratios. If the ratios 
are > 1  then w^ must be greater in absolute terms than if the ratios 
are < 1. Evidence from a model of the U.S. economy similar to the 
one developed in this study suggests that these ratios are both 
> 1.11
The second term in the partial derivative is more complex 




after substituting AQ(f^g^) for k ^  and rearranging. As noted 
earlier g3 V^ represents the policy induced change in the money 
supply. Since the model employed in this study requires that the 
quantity of money demanded equals the quantity of money supplied 
in every period, ĝ V-i represents the change in i"? required
1 a2 c
l^Moroney and Mason, "The Dynamic Impacts," p. 803.
103
to equate the quantity demanded and supplied. Since is the
coefficient on di™ in the equation for dM^ (equation (3.10'))
Anf jg3 V 1  ■ g. represents the change in the quantity of money 
A2
resulting from the equilibrium of the quantity of money demanded 
and supplied. We should note that the change in the quantity of 
money due to the equilibration process is in the opposite direc­
tion of the policy induced change at the initial level of the 
market interest rate.
The analysis of the third term in the partial derivative,
A-t <3g. — can be facilitated by substituting the full expression for 
1 A2
A13A^ 3  in the term g^ —— . Since A^ 3  = (l+agjf^* we can rewrite this 
term as
(l+ag)!! l+a.2 1+&2
gn ---    or as g,f' (— -— ). The term (— j— ) represents the
“2 2 2 2
change in income resulting from the expansionary fiscal action 
financed by bond issuance (hence the inclusion of a£ - the coef­
ficient on net wealth in the consumption function - in the 
numerator). Since f^ is the coefficient on dYt in the equation
for di™ (equation (3.9")) and since g^ is the coefficient on di™
q f H*anin the equation for dM£, the expression g-,fo (---—)is the changec c A 2
in the money supply induced by private sector response to higher 
interest rates brought about by the increase in income generated
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by the expansionary fiscal policy action. We should note that this
change in the quantity of money is in the same direction as the
policy induced change at the initial level of market interest rates.
The three effects of dG > 0  on dMj? can be illustrated in£ t
the context of the monetary sector of the macromodel. Let the 




Money Supply Effects of Increased Government 
Expenditures With Accommodative Federal Reserve Response
If g3 (-V1) is > 0, then dGt > 0 induces a rightward shift of M^ to 
S as the Federal Reserve responds to the fiscal policy action.
The policy induced change in money is thus - M^. Immediate
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restoration of equilibrium requires a reduction in i™ to i™; 
this reduction would induce private sector response that would 
reduce the expansion in the level of money from to M^. This 
is the effect represented by the second term of the partial 
derivative. However, as income begins to rise because of dG > 0 
and the initial fall in i^, the money demand curve will shift to 
M®. The interest rate will begin to rise and private sector 
response will induce an expansion in the money supply beyond 
to M̂ '. If the money demand curve shifts out to then pri­
vate sector response will induce an expansion in the money supply 
beyond to m ”' . Whether the money supply ultimately rises 
beyond the policy induced change at the initial interest rate 
depends upon the magnitude of the change in income and the income 
elasticity of money demand.
Thus when ggC-V^) > 0, the ultimate response of the money 
supply to dGfc > 0 is >0. Private sector response may or may not 
expand the money supply beyond the policy induced change at the 
initial interest rate.
When g3 (-V1) < 0, that is, when the Federal Reserve con­
tracts the money supply in response to a fiscal action of dGt > 0 , 
perhaps because of an overriding concern for possible inflationary
consequences of this policy, the ultimate change in the money 
>supply could be - 0. While the policy response is unambiguous, 
the private sector response may result in a rise in the money supply.
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The Initial private sector response before income changes
A f'0 1“a—  ®1  ̂ > ® since the policy induced reduction in the money
supply drives up the market interest rate thereby inducing action in 
the private sector that partly offsets the policy induced contraction 
in the nfoney supply.
Let us initially assume that the expansionary fiscal action 
has a stronger effect upon aggregate demand than does the contrac­
tion in the money supply so that income rises. When income begins 
to rise, the demand for money rises, and the market interest rate 
begins to rise. This rise results in further private sector 
response that mitigates or even offsets the initial reduction in 
the money supply.
These effects can again be illustrated graphically (see Figure
gII). The policy induced response shifts the money supply curve to 
thereby reducing the money supply by Mq - at i™. However, the 
adjustment to equilibrium drives i|!j to i™ and induces private sector 
response that partly offsets the initial fall. With unchanged 
income, the reduction in the money supply is M q - M^. As income 
rises, the money demand curve shifts out, say to M^. The interest 
rate rises, and the money supply expands to M^. Thus the initial 
reduction is further blunted by the shift in money demand. Note 
also that if the shift in money demand is sufficiently large, 
say to M^, then the final level of the money supply (Mj” ) is
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Figure II
Money Supply Effects of Increased Government Expenditures 
With Non-Accommodative Federal Reserve Response
greater than the initial level, even though the policy reaction 
initially lowers the money supply.
We must also consider the possibility that the negative 
response of the Federal Reserve is so large that income falls. In 
this instance, private sector response may drive the money supply 
below the policy induced reduction. However, for this possibility 
to occur, C-V^) not only must be negative but must also be large in 
absolute size. A response of the size necessary to reduce income 
in the face of expansionary fiscal policy might be found if the 
economy were in an hyperinflationary period and the Federal Reserve 
heavily weighted a deviation of the actual inflation rate from the 
desired rate.
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The sign of 3dM^/3Yt_^dr^ ^ will now be evaluated. This 
partial derivative is given by
®3V2 - *1 V 2  - ® 1 - ^ -
Again, as a starting point, the sign of V 2 » the coefficient on 
Yfc_^dr^ t (the exogenous change in tax receipts) in the policy 
reaction function, will be evaluated. V£ can be written as:
A11A4S1"w 4A21A14
As noted earlier in this chapter, S2  > 0. For V 2  to be < 0 (thereby 
implying that the Federal Reserve reduces any change in the level 
of its policy instrument in response to an increase in exogenous tax 
receipts), the term [A^A^S^-w^A^A^] must also be < 0. This 
inequality will be met if
w 4  > ^ ^ - ) S r  
2 1  A14
A 1 1  a 4Thus if w. > (—— -r——)S. (as was necessary for the level of 
* 2 1  14
the policy tool to expand when dGt > 0), V 2  would be < 0 and
Ŷ . ,dr, > 0  would lead to a reduction in the level of the policy t- 1  l,t
tool. If Y dr, > 0, any deficit is reduced and government 
bonds are retired. The retirement of the bonds reduces the market 
interest rate. The Federal Reserve would then reduce the level of
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its policy variable to offset this presumably undesirable fluc­
tuation in market interest rates. Thus when financial market 
stability is more heavily weighted than are other policy goals, 
the Federal Reserve changes its policy variable to offset the finan­
cial market effects of Yt_^dr^ t > 0. Note again that the extent 
to which w^ must exceed depends upon the values of the ratios 
(A1 1 /A2 1 ) and (A^/A^). If the ratios are > 1 then w^ must be 
greater in absolute terms than if the ratios are < 1 .
If V 2  < 0, then g ^ 2  a^so < That is, if V 2  < 0, an 
increase in exogenous tax receipts leads to a reduction in the 
money supply at the initial level of the market interest rate as 
a result of the Federal Reserve reaction to the fall in a deficit 
(or a rise in a surplus) brought about by the rise in exogenous 
tax receipts.
The second term in the partial derivative can be rewritten 
A f'
as §3 ^ 2  ^ ^ Si• Following the logic of the analysis of the
a 2
O —similar term in 3dMt/3dGt, this term represents the change in the 
money supply resulting from the equilibration of the quantity of money 
demanded and supplied after the policy induced change in the money 
supply. In the case of V 2  < 0, this change due to the equilibration 
process is > 0 .
The third term in the partial derivative can be rewritten as
aj+ao ai'baog-f'C— t— ) since An/ = (a_+a0 )f’. The term (— ?— ) represents the 
2 2
change in income resulting from the exogenous increase in tax
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receipts; the entire expression is the change in the money supply 
induced by private sector response to a change in the interest 
rate brought about by the change in income generated by contrac­
tionary fiscal policy action. Again, we should note that this 
change in the quantity of money is in the same direction as the 
policy induced change at the initial level of the market interest 
rate.
Graphically, the events described in the preceding para­
graph can be represented in the following way
Figure III
Money Supply Effects of Increased Tax Receipts 
With Accommodative Federal Reserve Response
Ill
The policy response of the Federal Reserve results in the leftward
shift of Mq to the money supply falls by Mq - at the initial
level of the interest rate. However, as the interest rate begins to
rise, private sector response leads to an increase in the money
supply to M|. As income begins to fall, money demand shifts down
to M^, and private sector actions result in a fall in the money
supply to M”. The final level of the money supply can thus be less
than or greater than the initial policy induced decline (the decline
will be greater (to M^') if, for example, money demand falls to M^).
If the Federal Reserve responds to ^ rl t > ^
increasing its policy variable (V£ > 0 ), then g3 V 2  > 0 ; that is,
the money supply rises as a result of the Federal Reserve policy
action. Furthermore, when V 2  > 0, the response of the private
sector in restoring equilibrium in the money market at an initially
unchanged level of income reduces the money supply below the initial
Â f,'policy induced expansion ([-^Vg ■ ^ x g^] < 0). If, as a result of
t > 0 , income begins to fall, money demand begins to fall
and private sector response further reduces the money supply,
possibly below the initial level before the change in tax receipts 
a-i+ao([-g.f^ — — —)] < 0). However, one must also consider the possi- 
A2
bility that the policy induced expansion in the money supply cancels 
or outweighs any contractionary effects of > 0. If the
monetary expansion cancels the contractionary effect of the tax
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increase, then the ultimate monetary response to Yt_^dr^ t > 0  
is an increase beyond the initial level but less than the policy 
induced increase. If the monetary expansion outweighs the contrac­
tionary tax effects then income will rise, money demand will rise, 
and the money supply may expand beyond the initial policy induced 
increase.
The analysis thus far has examined the cases where V-̂  < 0 
and V 2  I 0. If either or both and V 2  equaled 0 (implying that
the Federal Reserve doesn't respond to dGfc and/or Yt_^dr^ then
S -the appropriate partial derivatives of dMt with respect to dGt
or Y -.dr, . would be the same as in the case of exogenous monetaryC"*! X j t
policy.
The results of the analysis are summarized in the following 
Table I, p. 113.
V. Conclusion
Thus we see that in the case of exogenous monetary policy* 
given the traditionally expected signs of the structural coeffi­
cients in the equations of the macromodel, dGfc > 0 unambiguously 
leads to an expansion in the money supply and Y t_^dr^ t > 0  
unambiguously leads to a contraction in the money supply. However, 
when monetary policy is endogenous, dG > 0 may lead to either an 
expansion or contraction in the money supply and Yfc ^dr^ ^ > 0 may 
also lead to either an expansion or contraction in the money supply.
/
Table I
Fiscal Policy Effects Upon Changes in the Money Supply
Exogenous 




* 1  a" (>0)* . -g3 V 1 +g 1  ^ 2 1  V 1 +g 1  ^ 1 3  and (a) (-V^X) (>0)
(b) ( - V ^ O
(1 ) income rises (<0 )
(2 ) income falls (<0 )
(c) (-V- ^ 0  (>0 )
9dM^
9Y ,dr t- 1  l,t
-g. « 0 )1 A 2 S3V2"gl t2 1  V2 " 81 t1 4  and (a) V2> 0  (<0)“ 2  ^ 2
(b) V 2 < 0
(1 ) income rises (<0 )
(2 ) income falls (<0 )
(c) V2=0 (<0)
*( ) indicates direction of change in the money supply 113
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The ambiguity in the case of endogenous monetary policy stems 
from the fact that the direction of change in the policy instru­
ment depends upon the relative weights in the policymaker's loss 
function, the magnitude of the change in the policy instrument 
depends upon the relative weights and relevant structural para­
meters of the macromodel, and the ultimate change in the money 
supply depends upon the reactions of the Federal Reserve and the 
private sector (this reaction depends upon the structural para­
meters of the model) to the fiscal policy change.
The question of the effect of fiscal policy upon changes in 
the money supply cannot be finally answered by analysis of a theo­
retical macromodel that treats monetary policy as endogenous. 
Although manipulation of the macromodel allows one to examine 
the conditions under which the direction of change can be deter­
mined, the actual response of the monetary authorities to federal 
deficits can only be determined by empirical estimation of the 
macromodel and the monetary policy reaction function. The 
analysis in the next chapter will be directed to empirical esti­
mation of the macromodel and the policy reaction function.
CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FISCAL POLICY - 
MONEY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP
I. Introduction
The previous chapter examined the effects of fiscal policy 
upon the money supply when Federal Reserve policymakers are pre­
sumed to systematically and predictably react to current and 
previous period movements in economic variables. It was shown that 
changes in government expenditures and taxes have an ambiguous impact 
upon the money supply. The direction of change of the money supply 
depends upon the reactions of Federal Reserve policymakers and the 
private sector of the economy to the change in fiscal policy, and 
these reactions in turn depend upon the relative weights in the 
Federal Reserve loss function and the structural parameters of the 
macromodel. Thus to determine the actual response of the Federal 
Reserve and the money supply to fiscal policy, the structural para­
meters of the macromodel and the coefficients in the Federal Reserve 
reaction function must be empirically estimated.
Presentation and analysis of these empirical estimates occupy 
the remainder of this chapter. Estimates of the structural parameters 
of the macromodel when the Federal Reserve is exogenous and when the 
Federal Reserve is endogenous are presented and analyzed in section II 
of this chapter. Estimates of the coefficients in the reaction func­
tion and the implicit relative weights in the loss function are
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examined in section III. Reduced form money supply equations for 
both the macromodel with the Federal Reserve exogeneous and the 
model with the Federal Reserve endogenous are presented and analyzed 
in section IV.
II. Parameter Estimates for the Macromodels
Since an interdependent system of equations is to be estimated, 
a systems method is employed. Ordinary least squares estimation of 
the equations of a simultaneous system leads to inconsistent estimates 
of the structural parameters, but the problem of inconsistent esti­
mates is overcome through the use of a systems method of estimation.
An iterative three-stage least squares estimation technique is employed 
in this study since this technique produces consistent and asymp­
totically efficient estimates of the structural parameters. This 
technique utilizes information about the correlation between structural 
disturbances in the estimation of the equations of the system, infor­
mation that is not utilized in the two-stage least squares estimation 
technique.^"
The estimates of the structural parameters of the macromodels 
with the Federal Reserve exogenous and with the Federal Reserve endoge­
nous are presented in Tables I and II, respectively. Definitions of 
the variables are provided in Table III. The equations of these 
models are discussed below. These models were estimated from
^For a technical description of the three-stage least squares 
technique and other systems methods of estimation, see, for example,
Jan Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics, (New York: The Macmillan Com­
pany, 1971), pp. 531-99.
Table I
Model 1: Federal Reserve Exogenous*
Product Sector
(1) Yt * ct + Ic + ct + rtL + Et “ 1Mt
(2) Ct - -10.54 + .257 YDC + .018 WEfc + .728 C
(-3.43) (4.25) (3.03) (10.48)
(3) YDt - Yt - KCAt - TScL - TE,EN - TE,EX
(4) WEt - 620.38 - 34.94 l“ - 53.74 1* + .572 Y
( 33.72) (-9.23) (-5.22) (18.13)
(5) It - 9.82 - 3.31 1̂ _2 + .166 dYt l  + .053 Y + .685 I x
(3.28) (-2.25) (1.97) (5.85) (13.69)




(8) i“ - 8.67 - .099 + .015 Y +  .596 PE
(3.99) (-3.44) (3.84) (6.81)
(Equlllbrluo Condition)
R2 ■ .998 (Consumption Function)
(Disposable Income Deflnldon) 
R2 ” .923 (Wealth Function)
R2 » .986 (Investment Function)
-2R = .991 (Import Function)
(Equilibrium Condition)
_2R « .683 (Inverse Money Demand Function)
MH-*
Table I (Continued)
(9) H5 - 32.53 + 3.88 1l” - lj?S] + 7.46 I'BR R2 = .991t c c c
•(20.54) (3.35) (103.25)
(10) 1* =* .351 + .069 l" + .0006 Y + .780 R2 = .985
(3.88) (3.64) (3.66) (16.33)
Price Sector
(11) P = .401 - .113 RADt + .923 P̂ - .016 CP - .546 WPC + 2.82 WPCAF R2 =




*t-statlstlcs are In parentheses below each coefficient. R̂ = R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom.
TABLE II
Model tl: Federal Reserve Endogenous*
Product Sec Cor
(1) Yt = Ct * It + *• *■ Kt - tHt
(2) Ct » -10.88 + .304 YDt + .02 WEC + .673 C j R2 - .
(-3.58) (5.20) (3.40) (9.99)
(3) YDt - Yt - KCAt - T̂L - TE,EN - t£,EX
(4) WEt =■ 617.61 - 35.29 l" - 51.58 1* + .565 Yt R2 = .
(34.53) (-9.49) (-5.20) (18.44)
(5) lt - 9.13 - 2.88 1̂ _2 + .197 <!Yt_l + .049 Y( + .697 1 R2 = .
(3.07) (-1.98) (2.41) (5.48) (14.06)
(6) . IMt = -2.89 + .008 Y£ + .960 IHt t R2 = .
(-2.14) (2.22) (26.70)
Monetary Sector
(7) = MSC t
18) 1™ = 8.08 - .091 + .014 Y + .582 PE R2 « .
(3.82) (-3.25) (1.67) (6.71)















(Inverse Monev Demand Find on)
(Money Supply Function)
Table IT (Continued)
(10) UBRt - 6.57 + .022 - .034 t £,EX + .017 j + .003 RYH^ r 2 » .998
(6.55) (2.98) (-2.98) (19.26) (2.27)
+ .051 + .172 IIDEHO + .123IIREP2 - .573 i"_j + .048 CP
(.894) (2.47) (2.04) (-11.41) (.435)
+ .342 UPC + .583 WPCAF
(2.08) (3.56)
(11) I* = .38 + .074 1™ + .0006 Yt + .762 R2 = .985
(4.25) (4.00) (4.04) (16.28)
Price Sector
(12) Pt - .52 - .075 RADt + .897 - .135 CP - .505 WPC + 2.74 WPCAF R2 »
(1.79) (-3.56) (11.05) (-.36) (-.93) (4.93)








Y = nominal GNP, period t.
= nominal consumption expenditures, period t.
Ct ^ B nominal consumption expenditures, period t-1 .
It = nominal investment expenditures, period t.
= nominal investment expenditures, period t-1 ,
FGt = nominal federal government expenditures on goods and services
period t.
SLG = nominal state and local government expenditures on goods and
services, period t.
= nominal exports, period t.
IMt = nominal imports, period t.
IMt_^ = nominal imports, period t-1 .
YDt = nominal disposable income, period t.
WEt = nominal net wealth, period t.
KCAt = nominal value of capital consumption allowance, period t.
SLTfc = nominal state and local net tax receipts, period t.
F ENT * “ nominal endogenous federal net tax receipts, period t.
F EXT * = nominal exogenous federal net tax receipts, period t.
i™ = short-term interest rate (3-month Treasury bill rate), period t.
i”| . = short-term interest rate (3-month Treasury bill rate), period
C_X t-1 .
Iifc «= long-term interest rate (long-term federal government bond 
rate), period t.
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£,it_l “ long-term Interest rate (long-term federal government bond 
rate), period t-1 .
£
i 2  “ long-term interest rate (long-term federal government bond 
rate), period t-2 .
dYt_^ = change in nominal income from period t- 2  to t-1 .
= nominal money demand, period t.
SM = nominal money supply, period t.
. £P = anticipated rate of inflation, period t.
*~DSit = Federal Reserve discount rate, period t.
UBRt = nominal unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve requirement 
changes, period t.
RYHt = real high-employment output, period t.
•DP = Federal Reserve desired rate of inflation, period t.
• dIIDEMO = interaction dummy variable for P and Kennedy-Johnson 
administration.
IIRZP2 = interaction dummy variable for pj? and Nixon-Ford 
administration.
WPC = wage and price freeze dummy variable.
WPCAF = post-freeze wage and price control dummy variable,
GP = guidepost dummy variable.
P = actual rate of inflation, period t.
RADj. = aggregate demand proxy, period t.
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seasonally adjusted, quarterly data beginning in the first quarter of 
1953 (1953:01) and ending in the last quarter of 1976 (1976:04).^
This period was selected since it spans three political regimes of 
eight consecutive years each. Eisenhower was President from 1953:01- 
1960:04, Kennedy and Johnson from 1961:01-1968:04, and Nixon and Ford 
from 1969:01-1976:04. The sample period was chosen to facilitate the 
testing of the hypothesis that Federal Reserve policies reflect, in 
part, changes in political attitudes toward economic policy generated 
by changes in presidential administrations. The influence of the 
administration on Federal Reserve behavior could result from public 
discussion of Federal Reserve policies by fiscal policymakers or 
from joint discussion of policy problems by Federal Reserve and fiscal 
policymakers. The testing of this hypothesis is discussed in section 
III of this chapter. The model is estimated in level rather than 
first-difference form. Data sources are described in the appendix.
It should be noted that the consumption, import, and term- 
structure equations differ slightly from the specifications made in 
Chapter III. The difference in each case is the inclusion of the 
dependent variable lagged one period as an explanatory variable. The 
inclusion of such a term is consistent with an implicit Koyck lag 
structure. Since economic theory has little to say about the
2The estimation package used is the LS123 program written by 
J. Tu of the Brookings Institution.
The Durbin-Watson statistics are not presented in Tables I and 
II since they are unreliable indicators of autocorrelation in the 
presence of lagged dependent variables.
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appropriate time lags to be Imposed In an equation, considerable
experimentation with alternative lag schemes led to the adoption of
the implicit Koyck lag structure for the consumption, import, term-
structure, and investment equations. The Investment equation was
specified in Chapter III with an implicit Koyck lag structure due
3to the gradual adjustment of actual to desired investments. Similar 
lag structures for the wealth, short-term interest rate, money supply, 
inflation, and reaction function equations were tested but did not 
improve the fit of these equations. Hence, these equations have no 
lagged terms as explanatory variables.
The individual equations of the models will now be discussed. 
Since t-tests revealed that only the coefficient on RADfc differed 
significantly (at the 5 percent level) between Models I and II, and 
since Model II contains the reaction function for the monetary 
authority, the discussion of the individual equations will be limited 
to Model II.
All coefficients in the consumption function are of the 
expected sign and are significant at the 5 percent level.
Disposable income is a jointly dependent variable in the 
model and is derived by subtracting the aggregate capital consumption
3It should be noted that the lag patterns experimented with in 
the estimation of the system were restricted by the characteristics 
of the three-stage least squares estimation package utilized in this 
study. The package employed could not accommodate polynomial lag 
structures. Thus implicit Koyck lag structures were preferable to 
any other lag pattern tested, but a polynominal lag structure may or 
may not have been preferable to the implicit Koyck structures utilized 
in this study.
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allowance and total net taxes (state, local, and federal) from GNP.
The capital consumption allowance and net taxes for state and local 
governments are assumed to be exogenous to the model. Federal net 
taxes are split into an exogenous and an endogenous component. This 
division of net taxes is accomplished in the following manner.
Beginning with a tax function of the form T “ rY where T = net federal 
tax receipts, r = average tax rate, and Y = GNP, we can write
T. = T. , + dT. where dTfc = T„ - T _. t t— 1  t t t t— 1
Differentiating T = rY we obtain
dT = rdY + Ydr.
Thus, dT s r .dY„ + Y.t t—± t t— 1  t
The term rt_^dYt represents the change in net tax receipts when rfc_^ 
is unchanged but Y changes. This term thus represents a component 
of the endogenous portion of tax receipts, that is, the change in 
receipts due only to changes in the level of economic activity.
The term Y appears to combine two effects on tax receipts
receipts - the effect of a change in the level of economic activity 
on the average tax rate and the effect of a discretionary change in 
tax rates on tax receipts. In a tax system with some progressive 
elements, one would expect r to fluctuate with changes in Y; as Y rises 
one expects r to rise and vice versa. However, because of exemptions
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and deductions that become accessable as one's Income rises, a system 
that is progressive in name may not in fact be progressive. Thus the 
proposition that r varies with changes in Y is an empirical question, 
and this proposition was tested by regressing dr on Y using ordinaryL U
least squares. rfc was calculated by dividing net federal tax receipts
in period t by Y£. The regression of drt on Y revealed no systematic
2variation of dr with changes in Y. The R for the equation was very 
low and the coefficient on Y was not statistically significant. Based 
upon this result, all changes in r were taken as discretionary so that 
the term Yt_^drt represents the exogenous change in tax receipts, that 
is, the change in tax receipts due only to a change in tax rates.
Utilizing the equation Tt = + dTfc and substituting from
the total differential we obtain
Tt ' V i V i  + rt-idYt + V i dV
Rearranging we obtain T " r. - (Y. , + dYfc) + Y. ..dr ort t—J. t—1 t t—1 t
Tt a + Yt-l^rt* tenn rt-lYt *S uset* to Senerate a time
series for endogenous net tax receipts and the term Y ^ rt is used
to generate a time series for exogenous net tax receipts. Examina­
tion of the time series so generated reveals that the change in exo­
genous receipts is generally in the same direction as announced 
changes in tax policy.
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However, one problem that emerges In utilizing this tech­
nique stems from the effect of a temporary change in tax receipts 
in one quarter on the tax rate for subsequent quarters. Take for 
example the case of a temporary rebate that applies only to one 
quarter. Net tax receipts will fall in this quarter and hence the 
net tax rate will fall in this quarter. Net tax receipts will return 
to the normal pattern in the next quarter but the change in the 
"permanent" tax rate will be exaggerated because of the temporary 
decline in tax receipts in the previous quarter. To reduce the 
exaggerated effect on the tax rate caused by temporary tax changes, 
the endogenous and exogenous components of tax receipts were calcu­
lated in the following manner: endogenous receipts (TE,E^) = r^
and exogenous receipts (TF »EX) = Yt_-jdr£ where r£ = (rt + rfc_^
+ ^ t _ 2  + rt_3 ) M  and dr^ = r^ - This technique thus reduces
the effect of a temporary change in receipts on the calculated rate 
in subsequent quarters by smoothing changes in the calculated rate 
and thereby reduces many of the puzzling sharp reversals in policy 
from the quarter of a temporary change to the next several quarters. 
The resulting time series are smoother than the initial series. The 
change in exogenous receipts again is generally in the same direction 
as announced changes in tax policy.
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The budget constraints for both the monetary and fiscal 
authorities are implicitly incorporated into the model through 
their effects upon the wealth variable. Wealth is measured here 
as MB + KSTK + VGS where MB = monetary base, KSTK = discounted value 
of net dividend payments to the public, and VGS « discounted value 
of interest payments on federal debt, which is treated for simplicity
* aas consisting solely of consols. Explicitly, KSTKt = DIVt/it where
DIVfc = current value of net dividend payments to private sector and 
£i„ = current value of the long term interest rate. VGS,. = INTG„/WDR,. t t t t
where INTGt = current total interest payments on federal government
debt held by private sector and WDR^ = a weighted discount rate. The
weighted discount rate is the weighted sum of the current period short
and long term interest rates where the weight on the long term rate
is the proportion of long term debt in the total federal debt and the 
%
weight on the short term rate is one minus the weight on the long term 
rate.
The weighting scheme thus results in all intermediate term 
debt being treated as short term debt. An alternative weighting
scheme would be to treat intermediate term debt as long term debt
and weight the short term rate by the proportion of short term debt 
in the total debt and weight the long term debt by one minus the
weight on the short term rate. Since over some time periods the
interest rate on intermediate term debt moves similarly to the short 
term rate (thus giving support to the first weighting scheme) and
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over other time periods moves similarly to the long term interest 
rate (thus giving support to the second weighting scheme), the first 
weighting scheme was used since the wealth variable including VGS 
generated with this scheme resulted in a better fit of the consump­
tion function.
Another alternative method of generating a weighted discount 
rate would be to treat the intermediate term interest rate as endoge­
nous and weight the short term, intermediate term and long term 
rates by their respective share in total debt. This method was 
rejected to avoid unduly complicating the model by introducing another 
stochastic equation.
It should be noted that treating all federal debt as consols 
rather than explicitly incorporating information about the term to 
maturity of the debt (which was not done because of the complexity 
of collecting this information and discounting over the term to 
maturity of each issue) results in a measure of the value of these 
securities greater than their actual market value. However, the 
value of government securities generated by the scheme outlined 
above should move in a similar fashion to the market value of 
government securities. Thus it is assumed that the measure of VGS 
outlined above is an acceptable proxy for the current market value 
of these securities.
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Since the measure of the market value of government securi­
ties likely overstates their actual market value, the measure of 
wealth employed here likely overstates the "true" net wealth of the 
private sector. However, since a change in an economic variable that 
affects the "true" net wealth should also affect the measure employed 
here in a similar manner, it is assumed that the measure used in 
this study is an acceptable proxy for the "true" measure of private 
sector net wealth. For example, a rise in market interest rates, 
ceteris paribus, will reduce VGS and KSTK in our model and should 
have the same effect upon the "true" wealth measure.
Wealth is treated in the model as an endogenous variable and 
in £is regressed on Yt, it> and i^. It is assumed that Y is a reasonable
proxy for DIV. and INTG„. An increase in DIV„ and INTG,., ceteris t t t t
paribus, leads to an increase in the wealth measure used here. An 
increase in MBt , even though the value of government securities held 
by the public falls by the same amount, leads to an increase in wealth 
by reducing market interest rates and thereby increasing the dis­
counted value of DIVt and INTGfc. Thus, as expected, the coefficient 
on Y in equation 4, Table II, is positive and statistically sig­
nificant. Also as expected, since an increase in market interest 
rates, ceteris paribus, lowers the discounted value of DIVfc and INTG^
ID £the coefficients on it and it in the wealth equation are negative 
and are statistically significant.
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Thus, even though the budget constraints of the monetary and 
fiscal authorities do not explicitly appear in the wealth equation, 
their effects appear implicitly through their impact upon the explana­
tory variables. To understand this, assume for simplicity an 
initially balanced budget. As was seen in Chapter II, an increase 
in government expenditures with constant tax receipts has two 
effects - the deficit, through the post-Accord budget constraint, 
requires issuance of more government'securities which, ceteris pari­
bus, tends to increase wealth, but the financing of the deficit tends 
to raise market interest rates which, ceteris paribus, tends to 
reduce wealth.
Both effects are captured in the model. The increased
government expenditures tend to raise aggregate demand and output
directly and to induce increases in consumption and investment
expenditure within the same quarter. Any crowding-out effects on
investment of financing the deficit are delayed two quarters.
Imports also rise within the same quarter, but given the size of
the relevant structural coefficients (on YDt in the consumption
function, on Y in the investment function, and on Yfc in the import
function) this rise is unlikely to offset the stimulative effects
upon C. and I.. Thus the increase in Y. as a result of the deficit t t t
tends to increase WEt (and thereby further increase Ct). At the 
same time, the increase in Y resulting from the deficit tends to 
raise both the short and long term interest rates and thereby reduce
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WEt (see equations 4, 8 , and 11, Table II). Evidence on whether the
depressing effect on wealth offsets the stimulatory effect on wealth
within the same quarter can be obtained by examining the reduced
form equation for wealth. The reduced form equations for WEt for
both Models I and II suggest that these same quarter effects are 
4expansionary.
All coefficients in the investment, import, and inverse money 
demand equations have the anticipated signs and are significant at 
the 5 percent level.
A price expectations variable is included in both the inverse 
money demand function (equation 8 ) and the inflation equation (equa-
• jg
tion 12). The price expectations variable, P , is calculated from an 
autoregression of the current inflation rate on past rates of infla­
tion. Economic units are seen in this approach as basing their 
expectation of the current rate of inflation solely upon past rates
of inflation. Both straight lag structures (regressing P on 
n
i | 0  with various values for n) and polynomial lag structures
were estimated. The best fit was found for the following straight lag 
structure
• p • p • • p
p? - pt-i - E(pt-i - pt-i>-
For Model I, the coefficients on G and T * in the reduced 
form for WEt are .186 and -.048, respectively. For Model II, the 
coefficients on and t £ » ^  in the reduced form for WE are .623 and 
-.731, respectively.
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Lag structures of longer length - both straight and polynominal - 
were characterized by sign reversals on lags beyond t-3. The equation 
employed thus implies that economic units form their expectations of 
inflation based upon the very recent past - the inflation rates for 
the past three quarters. The autoregressive equation selected is 
used to generate a time series of expected inflation rates which is 
then employed as an explanatory variable in the short-term interest 
rate and inflation rate equations.
An alternative technique of generating expected inflation 
rates was also tested. The technique tested was suggested by 
Toyoda and is based upon an adaptive expectations model.^ The 
specific model employed is
P̂ * - = E(P - P^ )e t *t-l M i t- 1  *t-l'*
This model states that the change in the expected rate of inflation 
is a function of the discrepancy between the actual and expected 
inflation rates in the previous period. E is an adjustment coeffi­
cient which shows the rate of adjustment to this discrepancy. 
Rearranging this equation we find
^T. Toyoda, "Price Expectations and the Short-Run and Long- 
Run Phillips Curves in Japan 1956-1968," Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 54, 3 (August 1972), pp. 267-74.
• £
Time series for P can now be constructed by employing the actual
inflation series, assuming a particular value for E, assuming a
*Estarting value for an^ then recursively solving the equation.
Ten series were generated by using values of E from .1 to 1 in incre­
ments of . 1  and by assuming an initial expected inflation rate of 0 . 
These ten time series were employed in the short-term interest rate
• Jj*
and inflation rate equations as measures of P . Estimation of the
*Eentire system of equations for each time series measure of P 
resulted in equations that had a poorer fit and that often had the 
opposite sign of the estimated parameters presented in Table I and
II. Because of the poorer fit and sign reversals, these measures of 
expected inflation were rejected in favor of the series generated by 
the autoregressive equation.
All coefficients in the money supply equation are of the anti­
cipated sign and are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The estimated equation differs slightly from the equation described in
in -DSChapter II. Rather than including ifc and it as separate explanatory
”DSvariables, the difference between i™, and ifc was employed as a
in -DSseparate explanatory variable. When it and it were employed as
—DSseparate explanatory variables, the coefficient on it was positive, 
the opposite of the anticipated sign. Combining i™ and i ^  into a 
single measure does not alter the theoretical rationale for including 
both variables in the money supply equation and since the regression 
results were more acceptable than when the variables were employed
135
separately, the single measure regression Is preferred. It should 
also be noted that UBRt is unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve 
requirement changes. Thus all of the Federal Reserve's major policy 
tools are reflected directly or indirectly in this equation.
All coefficients in the term-structure equation are of the 
anticipated sign and are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.
The inflation equation differs slightly in form from the 
equation specified in Chapter II. The equation in Chapter II included 
both the inverse of the total unemployment rate and an aggregate demand 
variable as separate explanatory variables. Considerable experimenta­
tion with the various forms of this equation led to the elimination of 
the unemployment rate variable from this equation. The unemployment 
rate variable, whether employed alone or with the aggregate demand 
variable or whether only the current period value or the current 
period value and lagged values were employed, consistently had the 
opposite of the anticipated sign. For this reason the unemployment 
rate variable was dropped from the equation and only the aggregate 
demand variable was retained.
The aggregate demand variable employed (RAD^) is similar to 
a variable employed by Gordon in a study of inflation in the 1970's.^
^R. J. Gordon, "Can the Inflation of the 1970s Be Explained," 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1 (1977), p. 269.
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The variable is defined in the following manner:
7where YH^ = nominal high employment GNP in the current period. The
term (YHt - Yt)/YHt measures the gap between potential and actual GNP
as a proportion of potential GNP. The numerator of RADt measures the
change in the proportional GNP gap from the previous to the current
quarter. Thus RADt represents the proportional rate of change in the
proportional GNP gap. One would expect an increase in RADt to reduce 
•
P since the pressure of aggregate demand on capacity is reduced. 
Therefore the anticipated sign of the coefficient on RADfc is negative. 
Other aggregate demand variables were employed both singly and in 
conjunction with RAD̂ .. However, the best fitting equation in terms 
of the match between estimated and anticipated coefficient signs and 
in terms of statistically significant coefficients on the aggregate 
demand variable(s) was the equation containing only RADt as the
g
aggregate demand variable.
Equations with various lag structures on these variables were also 
estimated but rejected.
Nominal high employment GNP (YH ) is constructed by multi­
plying real high employment GNP in period t by the actual GNP price 
deflator in period t.
8 ^ t ^ tOther aggregate demand variables tested included (— — ) ,
£
•), and (yjj-) • These measures were used as the sole aggre­
gate demand variable and the first two were used as companions to RADt<
137
The estimated Inflation equation also differs from the equation 
specified In Chapter II by the Inclusion of the guldepost (GP) and 
the wage and price control (WPC and WPCAF) dummy variables. One 
should take into account governmental programs that might temporarily
• « r
affect the fundamental relationships between Pfc, RAD̂ ., and P£ . By 
altering the wage and pricing options available to the private sector, 
the guideposts and wage and price controls should affect the infla­
tion process and therefore should be controlled for in an empirical 
study of the inflation process. The effects of the guideposts and 
wage and price controls are introduced through the use of dummy 
variables. The guidepost dummy variable has the value of 1 for the 
period 1963:1 to 1966:2 and 0 for all other periods. Wage and price 
controls are represented by two dummy variables. The first dummy 
variable, WPC, covers the period of price freeze and thus has a value 
of 1 from 1971:3 to 1972:4 and 0 for all other periods. Following 
Gordon, the second dummy, WPCAF, covers the period 1973:1 to 1975:1,
a period which covers the non-freeze portion of the controls and
, 9return to no controls.
The anticipated signs on GP, WPC, and WPCAF will now be 
discussed. To the extent that firms and workers complied with the 
voluntary guideposts, one expects the inflation rate in the guide- 
post period to be less than without guideposts. To the extent that
9R. J. Gordon, "World Inflation and Monetary Accommodation in 
Eight Countries," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2 (1977), 
p. 450.
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the voluntary guideposts were ignored, one expects no effect upon the 
inflation rate. The coefficient on GP is thus expected to be negative 
or zero. One would expect that a mandatory freeze on wage and price 
increases would reduce the inflation rate. Thus the expected sign 
on WPC is negative. However, when a freeze is lifted and programs 
like Phases II and III of Nixon's New Economic Policy which relied 
heavily upon voluntary compliance are implemented, one would expect 
a surge in the inflation rate as firms and workers attempt to secure 
previously prevented price and wage increases. The anticipated sign 
on WPCAF is thus positive.
All coefficients in the inflation rate equation are of the 
anticipated sign. However, the coefficients on GP and WPC are not 
statistically significant but the coefficients on all other variables 
are significant at the 5 percent level. Even though the t-tests on 
the GP and WPC variables lead to a rejection of the hypothesis that 
these coefficients differ from zero, they are retained in the infla­
tion equation. Even though the programs proxied by GP and WPC may 
have had a negligible effect upon the rate of inflation, they may have 
had a significant effect upon Federal Reserve policy. This proposition 
will be discussed when the reaction function is analyzed in the next
section. The coefficient on WPCAF indicates a very strong rebound
*Eeffect from the wage and price freeze. The coefficient on P is 
significantly different from zero. Furthermore, a t-test of the 
hypothesis that P = 1  leads to the non-rejection of the hypothesis,
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a finding that provides some support for the accelerationist approach 
to the inflation process.
The discussion thus far has focused upon the structural equa­
tions of Model II with the exception of the reaction function
(equation 10). It was seen that all coefficients are of the antici-
-2pated sign and that the R s indicate a reasonably good fit of the 
data. The reaction function will now be discussed in the following 
section.
III. The Federal Reserve Reaction Function
An essential element in the analysis of the relationship 
between fiscal policy and the money supply is the Federal Reserve 
reaction function. It is recalled that the reaction function relates 
the Federal Reserve policy tool to the lagged endogenous and exogenous 
variables in the system of equations and to the desired values of the 
arguments in the Federal Reserve's loss function. The coefficients 
on the explanatory variables in the reaction function are complex 
mixtures of the structural parameters of the model and the weights in 
the loss function.
A reaction function derived from the loss function and Model I 
would contain 18 lagged endogenous and exogenous variables and 4
^For a discussion of statistical tests of the accelerationist 
hypothesis, see for example, R. J. Gordon, "Recent Developments in 
the Theory of Inflation and Unemployment," Journal of Monetary Eco­
nomies , 2, 2 (April 1976), pp. 191-96 and A. M. Santomero and J. J. 
Seater, "The Inflation-Unemployment Trade-Off: A Critique of the
Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, 16, 2 (June 1978), 
pp. 525-7.
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variables for the desired values of the arguments In the loss function. 
It was felt that Including all 23 variables in the estimation of the 
reaction function would undesirably reduce the degrees of freedom for 
the estimation and would also result in a needlessly complex reaction
function. Hence, was employed as a proxy for all lagged endoge-
F F EX 11nous and exogenous variables except Gt, T * , GP, WPC, and WPCAF.
F F EXGt and T * were retained as individual arguments since the ultimate
concern of this study is the effect of fiscal policy upon the money
supply. GP, WPC, and WPCAF were retained in order to ascertain if
these programs had significant effects upon Federal Reserve behavior
and hence the money supply.
The reaction function was thus estimated by regressing the
Federal Reserve policy instrument - unborrowed reserves adjusted for
F F EXreserve requirement changes - on G , T ’ , Y GP, WPC, WPCAF and
desired values for (Y /P ), P , and i . Real high-employment GNP
U L>
(RYHt) was used as a measure of desired real income, the average
inflation rate over the previous four quarters was used as a measure
•Dof the desired inflation rate (Pt), and the level of the short-term 
interest rate in the previous quarter was used as a measure
^Since Et is an exogenous variable it should be in the 
reaction function. However, it cannot be assumed that Yt_^ is a proxy 
for Et. The reaction function was estimated with E as a separate 
explanatory variable. However, the t-statistic indicated the coef­
ficient was not significantly different from zero, and a general 
linear test of the significance of this coefficient led to nonrejec­
tion of the null hypothesis that the coefficient was equal to zero.
As a result of this test, Et was omitted from the reaction function.
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of the desired level of i™. It was assumed that the desired balance 
of trade was neither surplus nor deficit, so that no term for the 
desired balance of trade appears in the estimated reaction function.
In addition to these variables two dummy variables designed to cap­
ture any effects of the particular political administration upon 
Federal Reserve behavior (IIDEMO and IIREP2) appear in the estimated 
reaction function. The estimated reaction function will now be 
analyzed.
The coefficient on Federal government expenditures (.022) is
positive and the coefficient on exogenous federal tax receipts (-.034)
is negative. Both are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. Thus one sees that expansionary fiscal policy as measured
by an increase in federal expenditures or by a reduction in exogenous
federal taxes leads to an expansion in unborrowed reserves adjusted
12for reserve requirement changes within the same quarter. These
signs are expected when the weight on financial market stability
exceeds the weighted sum of the other weights in the Federal Reserve 
13loss function. Thus within the same quarter the Federal Reserve 
accommodates expansionary or contractionary fiscal policy, thereby 
reinforcing the effect of fiscal policy variables upon other 
endogenous variables within the system.
12The reaction function was also estimated using the new CEA 
estimates of high-employment expenditures and tax receipts; the 
coefficient on high-employment expenditures was .026 and the coeffi­
cient on high-employment receipts was -.015. Both were statistically 
significant.
13See pp. 100-12 in Chapter IV of this study.
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The coefficient on is positive (.017) and is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level. Since is employed as a proxy
for the aggregate demand effects of the excluded lagged endogenous and 
exogenous variables, the anticipated sign on depends upon the
relative weights in the loss function. The positive sign on is
expected when the weight on financial market stability exceeds the 
weighted sum of the other weights in the loss function, just as in 
the case of government expenditures. Since the coefficient is posi­
tive, the Federal Reserve is seen as accommodating increases in 
aggregate demand from the sources proxied by in order to offset
(at least partially) the effects of an increase in aggregate demand 
upon the short-term interest rate.
The coefficient on RYHt is also positive (.003) and is sig­
nificant at the 5 percent level, thus indicating an expansion (con­
traction) in UBRt as desired real income rises (falls). The coeffi­
cient on RYHt is a combination of the weights in the loss function 
and the reduced form coefficients on UBRt in the reduced forms for 
real income, the inflation rate, the short-term interest rate, and 
the balance of trade derived from Model I. Specifically, the 
coefficient as derived from the theoretical model developed in 
Chapter III is + W ^ )  where Wx = weight
on the gap between the actual and the desired real income in the 
loss function, c weight on the gap between the actual and the 
desired inflation rate, = weight on the gap between the actual
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and the desired short-term interest rate, = weight on the gap
between the actual and the desired balance of trade, and j.. j_J- j i. f
are the reduced form coefficients on UBRt for real income, the
inflation rate, the short-term interest rate, and the balance of trade.
From the theoretical model, one expects j^, ^  > ® an<* < 0>
these expectations are borne out by the reduced forms for Model I.
2 2 2Since the W^, i = 1, ..., 4, are positive the sum (W^j^ + ^2^2 + W3^3 
2+ is > 0 and > 0. Thus the expected sign is positive, and
the estimated coefficient is of the expected sign.
To test the proposition that Federal Reserve response to 
desired real income differed with different political administra­
tions, interaction dummy variables were employed in an estimation of 
the reaction function. The interaction dummy variables used test 
whether the coefficient on RYH^ shifted with different administra­
tions. Since the data cover three administrations, two dummy variables 
were employed. One interaction dummy, IYDEM0, consists of zeroes from 
1953:01-1960:04 and 1969:01-1976:04 and the actual values of RYH^ in 
the period of the Democratic administration, 1961:01-1968:04. The 
other dummy variable, IYREP2, consists of zeroes from 1953:01-1968:04 
and the actual values of RYHt from 1969:01-1976:04, the period spanning 
the Nixon-Ford administration. A regression equation containing RYHt, 
IYDEM0, IYREP2, and all other variables except IIDEMO and IIREP2 in 
equation 10, Table II as separate explanatory variables was estimated. 
The coefficient on RYHt in this equation was significant at the 5 
percent level, but the coefficients on IYDEMO and IYREP2 were not
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significant. In general, in multiple regression studies it is not 
valid to drop a variable from an equation merely because the t- 
statistic for that variable indicates the variable is not statis­
tically significant. To determine whether a variable can be
14dropped, a general linear test should be employed. However, tests
of statistical significance for dummy variables using the t-statistics
for these variables are equivalent to general linear tests of their
significance.^"’ Thus since the coefficients on IYDEMO and IYREP2
were not significant, these variables were dropped from the model.
These results suggest that the response of the Federal Reserve to
RYHt did not differ across political administrations.'*"*’
A four-quarter average of actual past Inflation rates was
•D 17employed as a measure of the desired inflation rate (Pfc). Thus 
"D * * • *P. = (P. , + Pfc o + q + P*. /)/4. The Federal Reserve is thus t t-± t—e. t— j t—4
seen as adjusting its desired inflation rate in response to the past
• T)behavior of this variable. Formulation of P in this manner implies 
14For a discussion of the general linear test, see J. Neter 
and W. Wasserman, Applied Linear Statistical Models (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1974), pp. 214-72.
"*'"’Neter and Wasserman, Applied Linear Statistical Models,
p. 308.
"^A regression equation containing RYH , IYDEMO, IYREP2, and 
other variables in equation 10, Table II including IIDEMO and IIREP2 
was estimated, but the conclusions reached in the earlier test were 
not altered.
17The inflation rate lagged one period was also employed, 
but the basic results were not altered.
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that the Federal Reserve does not want to induce large quarter-to- 
quarter fluctuations in the inflation rate, perhaps because of a 
concern that large fluctuations in Pt from quarter-to-quarter 
increase uncertainty in the economy and thereby worsen the perfor­
mance of the economy.
The coefficient on P^ from the theoretical model is
(W2 j 2 )/(W1jJ + W 2 j 2  + W 3 j 3  + W 4 jJ).
Since j 2  > 0, the expected sign on P*? is positive. As the desired 
inflation rate rises (falls) the Federal Reserve increases
• TV(decreases) UBRt. As expected, the coefficient on Pfc in the regres-
*Dsion is positive (.051). However, the coefficient on Pfc is not 
significant in equation 1 0 , which also contains interaction dummies 
for the desired inflation rate. In a regression excluding the 
interaction dummies the coefficient is both positive and statis­
tically significant.
To test the proposition that Federal Reserve response to 
the desired inflation rate differed with different political 
administrations, the interaction dummies IIDEMO and IIREP2 were 
employed in an estimation of the reaction function. IIDEMO 
consists of zeroes from 1953:01-1960:04 and 1969:01-1976:04 and 
the actual values of P^ from 1961:01-1968:04. IIREP2 consists 
of zeroes from 1953:01-1968:04 and the actual values of P® from 
1969:01-1976:04. The estimated coefficients on both IIDEMO and
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IIREP2 are positive and statistically significant. Thus the 
*Dcoefficient on Pt during the Kennedy-Johnson administration is 
.223 and the coefficient during the Nixon-Ford administration is 
.174.
The proposition that the Federal Reserve response to 
desired inflation varied over different political administrations 
is thus not rejected. The estimated equation indicates a signifi­
cantly greater response by the Federal Reserve to the desired 
inflation rate during the Kennedy-Johnson years and the Nixon-Ford 
years than during the Eisenhower years. However, even though each 
interaction dummy variable is significantly different from zero, 
a t-test revealed no significant difference in the magnitude of 
the two coefficients. That is, in a statistical sense, the coef­
ficient on IIDEMO (.172) is not significantly larger than the 
coefficient on IIREP2 (.123).18
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was 
chaired by two different individuals in the time period covered by 
this study - William McChesney Martin and Arthur M. Burns. To test 
whether a change in the chairmanship had an effect upon Federal 
Reserve policy, a dummy variable consisting of 0's during Chairman 
Martin's term and l's during Chairman Burns' term was added to the 
reaction function. However, the coefficient on this variable was 
not statistically significant and this variable was dropped from
18For a description of this statistical test, see Neter 
and Wasserman, Applied Linear Statistical Models, p. 309-10.
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the equation. Thus the hypothesis of no significant difference in 
policy due to the chairman was not rejected.
The short term interest rate in the previous quarter
is employed as a measure of the desired level of the short-term
interest rate. Financial market stability is defined here as the
absence of large quarter-to-quarter movements in the short-term
interest rate. Large fluctuations in this rate would be avoided
if the current rate were equal to or close to in magnitude the
previous quarter's short term rate. Hence i™ ^ is employed as the
19desired short-term rate. Since financial market stability is 
primarily a concern of the Federal Reserve and thus differs from 
the macroeconomic goals that the Federal Reserve shares with the 
fiscal authorities (here represented by the gaps between actual 
and desired real output, actual and desired inflation, and actual 
and desired states of the balance of trade), it is felt that tests 
of varying response by the Federal Reserve to the financial market 
stability goal across political administrations.are not supported 
by a priori considerations. Thus empirical tests of political 
interaction effects are not made for this variable.
The coefficient on i™ ^ from the theoretical model is
(W3j3)/(Wljl + W 2 j 2  + W3j3 + SlnCe j3 < °* the exPected
•^Studies which have used i^_x as desired rate of 
interest include P. Derosa and G. Stern, "Monetary Control and the 
Federal Funds Rate," Journal of Monetary Economics, 3, 2 (April 
1977), p. 220 and R. T. Froyen, "A Test of the Endogneiety of 
Monetary Policy," Journal of Econometrics, 2, 2 (July 1974), p. 180.
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sign on im ^ is negative. That is, an increase (decrease) in the 
desired short-term rate induces a reduction (increase) in UBRt>
The estimated coefficient on i® is negative (-.573) and is sta­
tistically significant at the 5 percent level, thus conforming to 
the theoretical expectation.
Since government programs like guideposts and wage and price 
controls are designed to control the inflation rate, one might 
expect the Federal Reserve to be more expansionary during periods 
of guideposts or wage and price controls than it would be without 
guideposts or controls, given the actual relation between aggregate 
demand and capacity. Under conditions of controls or guideposts, 
Federal Reserve policymakers may feel less pressure to curtail any 
expansion in reserves since the effects of an expansionary policy 
upon the inflation rate will be muted, at least temporarily. Thus, 
given behavior by the Federal Reserve of the sort just described, 
one expects positive coefficients on GP, WPC, and WPCAF.
The estimated coefficients on GP, WPC, and WPCAF are posi­
tive thus conforming to the expected signs. The coefficients on 
WPC and WPCAF are significant at the 5 percent level, but the 
coefficient on GP is not significantly different from zero. Thus 
we see that Federal Reserve behavior was significantly affected by 
the wage and price controls but was not significantly affected by 
the guideposts.
Estimation of the Federal Reserve reaction function provides 
statistical evidence of the effect of fiscal policy upon the Federal
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Reserve's policy variable. The reaction function specified and
estimated here indicates a good fit to the data (R^ = .998). The
estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables are, in every
case, of the anticipated sign and are, with the exceptions of the
• Dcoefficients on GP and Pt, statistically significant. Expansionary 
fiscal policy measured by an increase in federal expenditures or by 
a cut in exogenous tax receipts is associated with an expansion in 
UBRt, a relationship that is consistent with Federal Reserve accom­
modation of expansionary fiscal policy in order to mitigate the
2 0effects of fiscal policy upon the short-term interest rate. u
IV. Estimated Fiscal Policy Effects Upon the Money Supply
The previous sections of this chapter have examined the
estimated structural equations of the macromodel. The immediately
preceding section examined the reaction function for the Federal
Reserve and the effect of fiscal policy upon the monetary policy
variable. The effect of fiscal policy upon UBRt represents only
one channel by which fiscal policy can affect the money supply.
Fiscal policy, by changing Yt and i^, affects private sector
21behavior which in turn affects the money supply. x
^The effect of the time path of and on the time
path of UBRt can be determined by the derivation of dynamic multi­
pliers for G^ and t£>^. This derivation will be the subject of 
future research by the author.
21xFor a detailed description of this process, see Chapters 
II and III of this study.
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The immediate response of the money supply to the fiscal
policy variables can be estimated by solving the simultaneous
system of equations for the reduced form money supply equation.
In order to compare the immediate response of Ml to the fiscal
variables when the Federal Reserve is treated as exogenous and
when the Federal Reserve is treated as endogenous, the reduced
form equations for both Model I and Model II will be analyzed.
These equations are presented in Table IV.
As noted earlier, the coefficients on the explanatory
variables in the reduced form equations are estimates of the
immediate effects - the impact multipliers - of these variables
on the dependent variable. Thus from Table IV we see that for
Model I the impact multipliers for government expenditures and
exogenous tax receipts are .058 and -.015 respectively. The
22signs of these coefficients are as anticipated. Thus an
increase in G£ of $1 billion leads to an increase in Ml of $.058
billion and a tax cut of $1 billion leads to an increase in Ml
of $.015 billion within the same quarter. The change in the
money supply in this model stems solely from the private sector
response to the effects of fiscal policy on such variables as
Y. and i®.L t
2^See Chapter II, pp. 80-84 of this study.
Table IV
Reduced Form Money Supply Equations 










±lt- 1 -.047 -.046
it̂- 2 -.192 -.167
Ct- 1 .042 .039
dYt-l . 0 0 1 . 0 1 1

















The Impact multipliers for GE and from Model II are
.181 and -.207, respectively. A $1 billion increase in GE leads 
to an increase in Ml of $.181 billion and a cut in t e »e x leads to 
an expansion in Ml of $.207 billion within the same quarter.
A comparison of the impact multipliers for Models I and II 
reveals a substantial difference in the size of these multipliers 
for both GE and TE,EX, even though (with one exception) statistical 
test revealed no significant difference in the size of the struc­
tural coefficients for the equations common to both models. The 
size difference stems from the inclusion of the Federal Reserve 
reaction function in Model II. In Model II the change in the 
money supply is a result of changes in UBRt from Federal Reserve 
response to the state of fiscal policy and private sector response 
both to the state of fiscal policy and to changes in the monetary 
policy variable.
Thus we have seen that analysis of the response of the 
money supply to the state of fiscal policy requires consideration 
of Federal Reserve reaction to fiscal policy. Ignoring Federal 
Reserve response to fiscal policy and its economic effects leads 
one to underestimate the effect of fiscal policy upon the money 
supply within the same quarter. Assuming that the reaction 
function employed here is correctly specified, we find that the 
impact multiplier for G£ from the model without the reaction 
function is .058, a value substantially lower than the "true" 
impact multiplier of .181 from the model with the reaction
153
function. The same relationship is found for These
results should be useful to fiscal policymakers in designing
countercyclical fiscal policy. If these policymakers ignore
F F  F.yFederal Reserve response to G£ and T** in the design of fiscal 
policy, the resulting fiscal policy may prove to be overly 
stimulative in the case of expansionary fiscal policy and overly 
contractionary in the case of contractionary fiscal policy.
V. Conclusion
The estimation of two structural models and the Federal 
Reserve reaction function has been analyzed in this chapter. It 
was seen that the estimated structural coefficients for both 
Model I (Federal Reserve exogenous) and Model II (Federal Reserve 
endogenous) were of the anticipated sign and were, with the excep­
tion of the coefficients on GP and WPC in the inflation equation, 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Consideration
-Oof the R^s for the estimated equations indicated reasonably good 
fits to the data. Furthermore, t-tests led to the conclusion 
that (with one exception - RADt) there were no significant dif­
ferences (again at the 5 percent•level) in magnitude between the 
estimated parameters in the equations common to both Models I 
and II . 2 3
OO■“ Goldfeld and Blinder note that in principle misspecifying 
policy variables as exogenous when they are in fact endogenous may 
result in inconsistent estimates of structural parameters. However, 
they point out that as a practical matter this misspecification as 
exogenous may not significantly affect the structural parameter
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The estimated reaction function suggests that the Federal
Reserve systematically reacts to the state of the economy. The
basis of this systematic reaction is Federal Reserve concern with
macroeconomic stabilization goals and with financial market stability.
Of immediate concern to this study is the significant relationship
between fiscal policy variables and the monetary policy variable.
Furthermore, given the structure of the economy and the loss function
specified in this study, the signs of the coefficients on the fiscal
variables, in the reaction function, positive on and negative on 
F FyT * , imply that the Federal Reserve weights concern for financial
market stability relatively more than macroeconomic stabilization 
goals in its shprt-term response to fiscal policy.
The results presented in this chapter support the contention 
that unborrowed reserves are endogenous. Since unborrowed reserves 
are endogenous, it must also be concluded that the money supply is 
endogenous. Treatment of unborrowed reserves and the money supply 
as exogenous thus results in misspecification of the model. While 
this particular misspecification may not drastically alter the
estimates because in a structural model the misspecified policy 
variables are generally small in number relative to the total 
number of lagged endogenous and exogenous variables. Furthermore, 
only a few equations may be seriously affected since the policy 
variables generally appear in only a few equations. Using the 
Moroney-Mason model, Goldfeld and Blinder found no serious esti­
mation biases for the structural parameters when a variable that 
was endogenous was incorrectly treated as exogenous. See S. M. 
Goldfeld and A. S. Blinder, "Some Implications of Endogenous 
Stabilization Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3 
(1972), pp. 588-9 and 613-7.
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estimates of the structural parameters of the model, it will bias
the estimated multipliers for monetary and fiscal policy variables.^
Thus we saw that the impact multipliers for GE and xE,EX in the
reduced form equation for Ml from Model I severly underestimated
v F EXthe "true" impact multipliers for g £ and Tt’ when unborrowed 
reserves are endogenous.̂
It is thus important for fiscal policymakers to be cognizant 
of the systematic reaction of the Federal Reserve to the state of 
the economy. Fiscal policy formulated without regard to this syste­
matic reaction may result in overly expansionary or contractionary 
fiscal policy.
^Goldfeld and Blinder, "Some Implications," pp. 617-21.
^The derivation of dynamic multipliers for GE and tE,EX 
for Ml will be the subject of future research by the author.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The major purpose of this study is to analyze the theo­
retical linkages between fiscal policy and the money supply and to 
empirically estimate the effect of fiscal policy upon the money 
supply. The theoretical linkages are analyzed within the context 
of a linear variant of the IS-LM model that incorporates endogenous 
taxes, inflationary expectations, and budget constraints for both 
the monetary and fiscal authorities into the structure of the model. 
The empirical estimates of the effects of fiscal policy upon the 
money supply are obtained by estimating a version of the IS-LM model 
which contains a reaction function for the monetary authority.
In deriving the theoretical linkages, the monetary authority 
is viewed as minimizing a static quadratic loss function subject to 
its perception of the structure of the economy. The loss function 
contains as arguments the weighted squared deviations of actual from 
desired values for real output, the inflation rate, the balance of 
trade, and the short-term interest rate. The first three arguments 
in the loss function are measures of macroeconomic stabilization 
goals pursued by the monetary authority. The IS-LM model specified 
in this study is assumed to be an acceptable proxy for the structure 
of the economy perceived by the monetary authority.
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Solution of the monetary authority's optimization problem 
leads to specification of a reaction function for the monetary 
authority. This reaction function relates the monetary policy 
variable to the lagged endogenous and exogenous variables of the 
model and to the desired values of the arguments in the loss function. 
Specification of the reaction function permits analysis of the 
effects of fiscal policy upon the monetary policy variable since the 
fiscal policy variables (.federal government purchases of goods and 
services and exogenous federal net tax receipts) are exogenous vari­
ables . The anticipated effects of fiscal policy upon the policy 
variable can be analyzed by examining the fiscal variable coeffi­
cients in the reaction function. These coefficients are complex 
mixtures of the weights in the loss function and the structural 
parameters of the model.
Analysis of the fiscal variable coefficients in the reaction 
function leads to the conclusion that the coefficients on federal 
government expenditures and on exogenous federal net taxes will be 
positive and negative, respectively, if the weight on financial 
market stability exceeds a weighted sum of the weights on the macro- 
economic stabilization goals, given traditionally accepted signs on 
the structural coefficients. Thus, if this weight pattern holds, 
an expansionary fiscal policy will induce an expansion in the policy 
variable within the same quarter. That is, with this weight 
pattern, the monetary authority will accommodate an expansionary 
fiscal policy by increasing the policy variable.
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The effects of fiscal policy upon the money supply are then 
analyzed by solving the structural model with the reaction function 
for the reduced form money supply equation and examining the fiscal 
variable coefficients in this equation. The signs of these coeffi­
cients depend upon the reaction of the monetary authorities to fiscal 
policy and upon the effects of fiscal policy upon output and interest 
rates. Accommodation of expansionary fiscal policy by the monetary 
authority is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the reduced 
form coefficients on expenditures and net taxes to be positive and 
negative, respectively. That is, if the monetary authority accom­
modates expansionary fiscal policy, the reduced form coefficients on 
expenditures and net tax receipts must be positive and negative, 
respectively. However, even if the monetary authority is not accom­
modating, the reduced form coefficients could still be positive and 
negative, respectively, if the expansionary fiscal policy offsets 
the induced contraction in the monetary policy variable and raises 
output and demand sufficiently. In terms of money demand and supply, 
if the net effect of the combined expansionary fiscal policy and 
the induced contraction in the monetary policy variable is to shift 
the money demand curve to the right more than the money supply shifts 
to the left, the quantity of money will rise.
To empirically test the direction of effect of fiscal policy 
upon the monetary policy variable and the money supply, the IS-LM 
model with the derived reaction function is estimated utilizing
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iterative three-stage least squares. The estimated reaction 
function provides strong evidence that the monetary policy variable, 
unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve requirement changes, is 
endogenous; that is, the monetary authority systematically reacts 
to the movement of economic variables. Thus models that treat the 
policy variable as exogenous are misspecified, although the mis­
specification may not have serious consequences for the estimation 
of the other structural equations.
The estimated coefficients on federal expenditures and 
exogenous federal net tax receipts in the reaction function are 
positive and negative, respectively. The signs of these coefficients 
imply that the monetary authority weights financial market stability 
more heavily than the macroeconomic stabilization goals. Thus in 
the period covered by the estimation, 1953:01-1976:04, the Federal 
Reserve accommodated expansionary fiscal policy, thereby rein­
forcing the effect of fiscal policy upon the economy. However, it 
should be noted that while within the same quarter financial market 
stability seems to dominate other goals, Federal Reserve behavior 
is significantly influenced by these other goals. The coefficient 
on real high employment GNP is of the anticipated sign and statis­
tically significant. The coefficient on the desired inflation rate 
is of the anticipated sign but is not statistically significant. 
However, the significant coefficients on the interaction dummy vari­
ables for the desired inflation rate suggest that Federal Reserve
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response to the desired inflation rate varied significantly with 
the particular political administration, thus indicating some 
interaction between the varying attitudes toward macroeconomic 
stabilization goals introduced by a change in presidental admini­
strations and Federal Reserve reaction to these stabilization goals.
The effect of fiscal policy upon the money supply is 
analyzed by solving the estimated system of equations for the 
reduced form money supply equation. The coefficients on the fiscal 
variable in this equation reveal the immediate effect of these vari­
ables upon the money supply. Thus these coefficients can be 
interpreted as impact multipliers for the fiscal variables. Since 
the signs of the coefficients in the estimated reaction function 
imply accommodation of fiscal policy, -the expected signs on federal 
expenditures and exogenous net taxes in the reduced form equation 
are unambiguously positive and negative, respectively. Solution 
of the reduced form money supply equation reveals that the coef­
ficients on these variables are indeed positive and negative, 
respectively. Thus an increase in federal expenditures is asso­
ciated with a same quarter increase in the money supply; the impact 
multiplier for expenditures is .181. A reduction in exogenous tax 
receipts is also associated with a same quarter increase in the 
money supply; the impact multiplier for taxes is -.207.
The results outlined above are derived from the model with 
the Federal Reserve endogenous (Model II). To determine the effect 
upon the money supply impact multipliers for the fiscal policy
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variables when the Federal Reserve's policy instrument is mis­
takenly viewed as exogenous, the reduced form money supply 
equation was derived from the model estimated without a reaction 
function for the monetary authority (Model I). Even though the 
forms of the equations in Model I are identical to Model II and 
the estimated coefficients are not significantly different (with 
one exception), the money supply impact multipliers differ con­
siderably. In Model I the impact multiplier for federal expenditures 
is estimated as .058 and the impact multiplier for federal net taxes 
is estimated as -.015. These multipliers reflect only private 
sector response to the fiscal variables, but the multipliers for 
the model with the Federal Reserve endogenous reflect both private 
sector and Federal Reserve response to fiscal policy. One con­
cludes that failure to consider the response of the Federal Reserve 
to fiscal policy leads to underestimating the effects of fiscal 
variables upon the money supply.
This study thus shows that mistakenly treating the Federal 
Reserve as exogenous does not significantly affect the estimated 
parameters in the structural model but does significantly affect the 
estimates of the effect of fiscal policy upon the money supply.
Thus unless fiscal policymakers take into account the response of 
monetary policymakers to their actions, fiscal policy designed to 
counter a recession may be overstimulative or fiscal policy designed 
to counter inflation may be overly contractionary. Furthermore, 
as noted by Goldfeld and Blinder, an outside observer who attempts
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to assess the effects of fiscal policy upon the money supply or upon 
other endogenous variables will misestimate these effects unless the 
reaction function for the monetary authority is explicitly 
considered.^-
Finally, it should be noted that the results of this study 
should be taken as indicative but not definitive estimates of the 
effects of fiscal policy upon the money supply. The results presented 
in this paper are conditioned upon the proper specification of the 
loss function for the monetary authority and upon the proper speci­
fication of the structure of the economy perceived by the monetary 
authority. Specification of a multi-period loss function or employ­
ment of a large scale econometric model may modify the estimates 
presented here, although the estimates of the impact multipliers 
of fiscal policy upon the money supply are not altered drastically 
when different fiscal variables are employed in the reaction function. 
However, it should be noted that the one-period loss function used 
here is widely employed in reaction function studies and the model 
estimated here, although linear, is similar in nature to an econo-
2metric model employed by the Federal Reserve in policy determination.
^S. M. Goldfeld and A. S. Blinder, "Some Implications of 
Endogenous Stabilization Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 3 (1972), p. 623. Goldfeld and Blinder note that policy 
multipliers may be seriously misestimated. The examination of,fiscal 
multipliers for other endogenous variables such as Y, im , and P in the 
estimated model will be the subject of future research by the author.
2See for example, J. L. Pierce, "Quantitative Analysis for 
Decisions at the Federal Reserve," Annals of Economic and Social 
Measurement, 3, 1 (1974), pp. 11-19.
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APPENDIX ONE 
MATRIX DERIVATION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
POLICY REACTION FUNCTION
In matrix form the loss function can be written as:
A = (Yt - YJ)lW(Yt-Y*)
where
Y = 4 x 1 vector of actual values of the arguments in the loss 
function
Y* = 4 x 1 vector of desired values of the arguments in the loss
function
and








dP dP* 0 w„ 0t Y* = t w = 2
dBTt L dBT*t 0 0 W3
di* •> di“* ; and 0 0 0— _ _
The structure of the economy can be written as: Yt=JRt+HZt
where
Rt = 1 x 1 vector of the Federal Reserve policy variable,
J = 4 x 1  vector of coefficients on the policy variable,




Zj. = 1 2  x 1  vector of exogenous and lagged endogenous variables.
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where
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H13 A5^A2^Pt - 1  + A25^
H14 -a6 /a2(p^  + a25)
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H41 “ A 1 3 / a 2
H42 “ ~A14/A2
H43 -  a 1 5 /a2
H44 = “A16^A2
H45 y /  A2
and all other terms are as previously defined in this chapter and 
in Chapter Three.
As noted in the text of Chapter Four, the solution to the 
minimization problem is given by:
R = [J'WJJ^J'WY* - [J'WJ]"1 J'WHZ .U L L
Performance of the necessary matrix algebra yields the policy 
reaction function given in the text:
APPENDIX TWO 
DATA APPENDIX
I. Product Sector and Inflation Equation Data
General Comments: All data are in current dollars unless other­
wise specified and are seasonally adjusted 
at annual rates.
The following data were collected from the January 1976 and 
subsequent issues of the Survey of Current Business.
Y = Gross National Product, (billions of dollars)
C = Personal Consumption Expenditures, Durables and Nondurables,
(billions of dollars)
I = Gross Private Domestic Investment! (billions of dollars)
E = Exports, (billions of dollars)
IM = Imports, (billions of dollars)
KCA = Capital Consumption Allowances, (billions of dollars)
qF,T _ Total Federal Government Expenditures, (billions of dollars)
q F = Federal Government Expenditures on Goods and Services,
(billions of dollars) 
rjiSL,T _ Total Receipts, State and Local Governments, (billions of 
dollars)
GSL>T = Transfer Payments (Including Net Interest Paid), State and 
Local Government, (billions of dollars)




FDEF = Federal Government Deficit, National Income and Product 
Accounts, (billions of dollars)
DIV = Net Dividend Payments,(billions of dollars)
£ = Percent Change in Implicit GNP Deflator
The following data were supplied by the Research Division of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
YH = Nominal Potential GNP, New CEA Estimates, (billions of dollars)
RYH = Real Potential GNP, New CEA Estimates,(billions of dollars)
ENCEA = High-Employment Federal Expenditures, New CEA Estimates,
(billions of dollars)
RNCEA = High-Employment Federal Receipts, New CEA Estimates, 
(billions of dollars)
The following data were collected from the Treasury Bulletin, 
various issues.
INTGN = Interest Payments to the Public on Federal Debt, Not 
Seasonally Adjusted, (billions of dollars)
VE1 = Short-Term Federal Debt as Proportion of Total Federal
Debt, (percentage)
WE2 = Long-Term Federal Debt as Proportion of Total Federal 
Debt, (percentage)
Specific Comments: Other variables employed in the study were con­
structed from the data listed above. The construction of these 
variables will now be discussed.
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Net taxes for state and local governments were derived by 
subtracting state and local transfer payments (GSL,T) and federal 
grants-in-aid to state and local governments from total
receipts for state and local governments (TSL,T).
Net federal taxes were generated by first generating a time 
series for total federal receipts. Total federal receipts were ob­
tained by adding total federal expenditures (G*’’'*-) to the federal 
deficit (FDEF). Net tax receipts were obtained by subtracting trans­
fer payments (generated by subtracting federal purchase of goods and 
services (G^) from G^ ’̂ ) from total federal receipts.
These net tax measures along with KCA were used to generate 
personal disposable income (YD). To derive YD, KCA, net taxes for 
state and local governments, and net taxes for the federal govern­
ment were subtracted from GNP(Y).
Seasonally adjusted federal interest payments to the public 
on federal debt were obtained by seasonally adjusting INTGN with 
the Census Bureau’s X-ll seasonal adjustment program.
Measures of exogenous and endogenous federal net taxes were 
derived in the manner outlined in Chapter IV.
Private net wealth (NW) was then derived in the manner out­
lined in Chapter IV.
Descriptions of the construction of the aggregate demand 
proxy (RAD), the expected rate of inflation (P ) and the dummy vari­
ables WPC, WPCAF, and GP are presented in Chapter IV.
II. Monetary Sector Data
The following data were collected from Banking and Monetary 
Statistics (Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System), Annual Sta­
tistical Digest (Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System), and the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Mi = Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate (Market Yield), (percentage)
i = Long-Term Government Security Rate, (percentage)
i°S _ DiSC0Unt Rate, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (percentage)
CM = Ml, Current Dollar, Seasonally Adjusted, (billions of
dollars)
The following data were obtained from the Research Division 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. All data are in current 
dollars.
MB = Source Base (Monetary Base Unadjusted for Reserve Require­
ment Changes), Seasonally Adjusted, (billions of dollars)
SBN = Source Base, Not Seasonally Adjusted, (billions of dollars)
BRN = Member Bank Borrowings from the Federal Reserve, Not
Seasonally Adjusted, (billions of dollars)
CN = Currency Held by the Public, Not Seasonally Adjusted,
(billions of dollars)
RAM = Reserve Adjustment Magnitude, (billions of dollars)
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Specific Comments; Other variables employed in this study were con­
structed from the data listed above. The construction of these vari­
ables will now be discussed.
A seasonally adjusted time series for unborrowed reserves 
adjusted for reserve requirement changes (UBR) was constructed in 
the following manner. Unborrowed reserves adjusted for reserve 
requirement changes (not seasonally adjusted) were generated by 
subtracting CN and BRN from SBN and adding RAM to this result. This 
time series was then seasonally adjusted with the X-ll program to 
obtain UBR.
The dummy variables IIDEMO and IIREP2 and the Federal
• n
Reserve's desired rate of inflation (P ) were constructed in the 
manner described in Chapter IV.
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